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This thesis investigates the shift to theater-based missile defense (TBMD) systems from 
the U.S. and its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners’ perspectives, and it provides 
recommendations for developing a realistic pathway forward for the implementation of a 
TBMD system in the Persian Gulf region that takes into account the differences in the 
nature of security threats and collective security arrangements in this region. The 2010 
Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Report placed greater emphasis on theater-
level missile defenses to counter weapons of mass destruction proliferation that threatens 
the European, Asian, and Middle Eastern regions. However, the European and Asian 
TBMD systems are significantly more developed than the Persian Gulf’s capabilities. 
Lessons learned and key differences between threat capabilities and alliance structures 
within these regions have important implications for how a phased adaptive approach to 
missile defense is implemented in the Persian Gulf. Thus, a comparative case study 
analysis of the advanced European and Asian missile defense programs and the more 
modest Arabian Peninsula defense initiatives provides insight into developing a pathway 
forward for implementing a phased adaptive approach to missile defense that is tailored 
to the threats, interests, and abilities of the United States’ Persian Gulf partners.  
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.	   INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1	  
A.	   PURPOSE AND SCOPE: ............................................................................... 1	  
1.	   Question 1 ............................................................................................. 1	  
2.	   Question 2 ............................................................................................. 1	  
B.	   IMPORTANCE ............................................................................................... 2	  
C.	   LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................... 5	  
D.	   METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................ 13	  
E.	   THESIS OVERVIEW ................................................................................... 13	  
II.	   MOTIVATIONS AND INCENTIVES .................................................................... 15	  
A.	   THE SHIFT TO THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ............ 15	  
1.	   A Brief History of Nuclear Strategy and Ballistic Missile 
Defense Evolution .............................................................................. 15	  
2.	   The Paradigm Shift to Theater Missile Defense ............................. 19	  
3.	   The Phased Adaptive Approach ....................................................... 22	  
4.	   Theater Ballistic Missile Defense System Components .................. 22	  
B.	   THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE PERSIAN 
GULF .............................................................................................................. 26	  
1.	   Benefits and Drawbacks of Implementing TBMD in the Middle 
East ...................................................................................................... 28	  
III.	   EUROPEAN AND ASIAN THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
CASE STUDIES ........................................................................................................ 31	  
A.	   EUROPE ......................................................................................................... 31	  
1.	   The Threat .......................................................................................... 31	  
2.	   U.S.–European Alliance .................................................................... 34	  
3.	   NATO TMD Initiatives ..................................................................... 35	  
a.	   Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) ................ 35	  
b.	   European Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Site ... 37	  
c.	   European Phased Adaptive Approach ................................... 37	  
4.	   Regional Implications ........................................................................ 39	  
B.	   ASIA ................................................................................................................ 40	  
1.	   The Threat .......................................................................................... 40	  
2.	   U.S.-Asia Pacific Alliances ................................................................ 42	  
3.	   U.S.-Japan TBMD Initiatives ........................................................... 43	  
4.	   Regional Implications ........................................................................ 44	  
C.	   THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE LESSONS LEARNED ......................... 45	  
IV.	   GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE 
DEFENSE CASE STUDY: THREAT ANALYSIS ................................................ 49	  
A.	   BACKGROUND: GCC-IRANIAN RELATIONS ..................................... 49	  
B.	   THE IRANIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT .................................... 52	  
C.	   GCC BMD OPTIONS TO COUNTER THE THREAT ............................ 56	  
 viii 
V.	   GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE 
DEFENSE CASE STUDY: U.S.-GCC ALLIANCE & INTRA-GCC 
RELATIONS .............................................................................................................. 61	  
A.	   BACKGROUND: GCC ALLIANCE AND FOREIGN SECURITY 
GUARANTORS ............................................................................................. 63	  
B.	   GCC COLLECTIVE SECURITY INITIATIVES ..................................... 67	  
1.	   The Iran-Iraq War ............................................................................ 68	  
2.	   The First Gulf War and Its Aftermath ............................................ 70	  
3.	   The Move towards Multilateralism: The Gulf Security 
Dialogue (GSD), the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, 
and the PSF Intervention in Bahrain ............................................... 72	  
C.	   THE INTRA-GCC POLITICAL-MILITARY BALANCE ...................... 74	  
D.	   CURRENT GCC TBMD CAPABILITIES AND INITIATIVES ............. 78	  
VI.	   A PERSIAN GULF PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH ..................................... 83	  
A.	   THEATER COMPARISON AND LESSONS LEARNED ........................ 83	  
B.	   POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................. 86	  
C.	   CRITICAL ISSUES ...................................................................................... 89	  
D.	   CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 90	  
LIST OF REFERENCES ...................................................................................................... 93	  




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.	   Iranian Ballistic Missile Threat to Europe. ...................................................... 33	  
Figure 2.	   European Phased Adaptive Approach. ............................................................ 39	  
Figure 3.	   North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat. ............................................................ 41	  
Figure 4.	   The Iranian Ballistic Missile Threat in the Persian Gulf. ................................ 54	  
Figure 5.	   U.S. Military Installations in the Persian Gulf. ............................................... 78	  
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.	   TBMD Sensor Capabilities .............................................................................. 26	  
Table 2.	   TMD Interceptor Capabilities .......................................................................... 26	  
Table 3.	   GCC & Iran Population, Economy, and Energy Statistics .............................. 76	  
Table 4.	   GCC & Iran Military Statistics ........................................................................ 77	  




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ABI Airborne Boost-phase Intercept 
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile 
ABMT Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
ALTBMD Active Layer Theater Ballistic Missile Defense 
AN/SPY-1 Army Navy/Sea-based S-band Radar Surveillance  
AN/TPY-2 Army Navy/Transportable X-band Radar Surveillance 
API Ascent Phase Intercept  
BMD  Ballistic Missile Defense  
BMDR Ballistic Missile Defense Review 
BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System 
C2BMC Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communication  
CAOC Combined Air and Space Operations Center 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention 
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
EI Early Intercept 
EPAA European Phased Adaptive Approach 
FMS Foreign Military Sales 
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council 
GBI Ground-Based Interceptor  
GMD Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
GPALS Global Protection Against Limited Strikes  
GSD Gulf Security Dialogue  
HAT Hizam Al-Taawun 
IAMD Integrated Air and Missile Defense 
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile  
IRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile 
JSDF Japanese Self Defense Force 
MAD Mutually Assured Destruction  
MDA Missile Defense Agency  
 xiv 
MEADS Medium Extended Air Defense System 
MKO Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization 
MRBM Medium-Range Ballistic Missile 
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime  
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NMD National Missile Defense 
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PAC PATRIOT Advanced Capability 
PATRIOT Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept On Target 
PSF Peninsula Shield Force 
QME Qualitative Military Edge  
R&D Research and Development  
SAMP-T Surface-to-Air Missile Platform-Terrain 
SBT Sea-Based Terminal 
SBX Sea-Based X-band Radar 
SCUD Subsonic Cruise Unarmed Decoy 
SDI Strategic Defense Initiative  
SM Standard Missile 
SM-T Standard Missile-Terminal  
SRBM Short-Range Ballistic Missile  
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
STSS Space Tracking and Surveillance System 
TBMD Theater Ballistic Missile Defense 
TEL Transporter Erector Launcher 
THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
TMD Theater Missile Defense 
UAE United Arab Emirates 
U.S.-GCC SCF United States – Gulf Cooperation Council Strategic Cooperation Forum 
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  




I would like to give a special thank you to my two thesis advisors, Dr. James 
Russell and Dr. James (Clay) Moltz, for their invaluable insight, feedback, 
encouragement, and motivation throughout this entire project. Additionally, I sincerely 
appreciated the feedback and guidance on my topic from Professor Richard (Mitch) 
Brown of the Naval War College in Monterey. I would also like to thank Professor Jeff 
Kline of the Operations Research Department who hosted a Missile Defense Agency 
Ballistic Missile Defense Staff Course, which sparked my initial interest in pursuing 
theater ballistic missile defense in the Middle East as a thesis topic.  
To my “clique” and Fadjus, your friendship and support in all matters both inside 
and outside of the classroom has enriched my time here at NPS undoubtedly, contributed 
to my personal growth, and provided me with a healthy work-life balance, which kept me 
sane throughout this academic journey.   
Lastly, to my long-time confidant Louise, your tremendous encouragement and 
time spent reading drafts of this thesis was much appreciated. Your friendship and 
inspiration throughout all these years continue to change me “for good.”  
 xvi 




A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE:  
This thesis focuses on understanding the United States’ shift in missile defense 
policy and strategy towards a theater-based approach and its Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) partners’1 interest in collaborating in such an endeavor. Additionally, this thesis 
seeks to develop a realistic pathway forward for the development and implementation of 
a theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) system in the Persian Gulf region that takes 
into account the unique nature of security threats and collective security arrangements 
within this part of the world. Thus, this thesis answers the following major research 
questions: 
1. Question 1 
What caused this recent paradigm shift in U.S. missile defense strategy from
 homeland defense to regional defense of allies and deployed forces?  
2. Question 2 
Why has the GCC embraced this U.S. shift in strategy, and what is a realistic 
 pathway forward for the development and implementation of a TBMD 
 architecture in the Persian Gulf region? 
These two questions are interrelated, because it is important to understand the 
development of policy decisions concerning missile defense and how the U.S. and GCC 
arrived at this current juncture of pursuing theater-focused ballistic missile defenses in 
order to look ahead and postulate how such TBMD architectures can be built to meet the 
security needs of individual regions. The motivations and incentives for the U.S. and its 
GCC allies to embrace a TBMD approach to countering weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) threats within the Persian Gulf region has implications for the development and 
implementation of such a technologically complex weapon system.  
                                                
1 The Gulf Cooperation Council consists of six Arab Gulf states: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).  
 2 
While building a TBMD architecture throughout a given region is a significant 
technological undertaking with physical threat data2 and weapons system parameters 
needing to be taken into account, this thesis focuses predominately on the political 
considerations of building a TBMD system with coalition partners. Placement of missile 
defense components has both technical and political implications; the physics of 
intercepting a missile with another missile has to be combined with the social aspects of 
state relations within the region in order for a missile defense system to be effective. This 
thesis will utilize the available, open-source physical threat characteristics and models 
depicting Iran’s ballistic missile capability as contextual information that is incorporated 
into the more in-depth consideration of domestic politics and relations between the GCC 
states and how these dynamics will impact the development of a robust TBMD system in 
this geographical area. The findings and recommendations from this thesis can provide a 
policy background for future research conducted within the technical realm of this region. 
While a TBMD system is meant to adapt to new threats as they arise, and it 
should not necessarily be based on a single threat, this thesis will only examine the most 
prominent ballistic missile threat to the Arab states within the Persian Gulf region found 
in Iran. The components of the TBMD system are transportable and reconfigurable, so 
the architecture can be rearranged to counter different threats that may arise in the future 
(i.e., Syria); however, the political implications of such a reconfiguration will not be 
considered in this thesis. The emphasis of this research is on countering the Iranian 
ballistic missile threat in the Persian Gulf. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Within the first year of the Obama Administration’s first term in office, official 
statements and documents were released indicating a clear paradigm shift in missile 
defense concentration from homeland to theater security. In July 2009, Secretary of State 
                                                
2 The term “physical threat data” is used to refer to technical and numerical data concerning Iranian 
ballistic missile characteristics and capabilities. For example, the number and type of missiles, where they 
are located, number of launchers, and trajectory profiles represent physical data that would be used to build 
models that would indicate optimal location for certain components of a TBMDS (i.e., sensors and 
interceptors).    
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Hillary Clinton referred to extending a “defense umbrella” over the Persian Gulf region,3 
and two months later in September, President Barack Obama announced the initiative to 
build a robust ballistic missile defense (BMD) architecture with NATO partners––known 
as the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)––to counter the threat of WMD 
proliferation.4 These statements were solidified five months later when the Secretary of 
Defense released the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Report, which 
placed greater emphasis on theater-level missile defenses to counter the North Korean 
and Iranian ballistic missile threats to the European, Asian, and Middle Eastern regions.5 
These statements and documents also suggest the willingness of the U.S. to pursue a non-
nuclear, positive security assurance option instead of the offensive extended nuclear 
deterrence options that it utilized throughout the Cold War era to provide its allies with 
assurances against WMD threats, so that they would fore-go acquiring their own nuclear, 
chemical, or biological weapon arsenals.            
This shift in American policy toward embracing theater missile defense was 
mirrored in the GCC states increased interest in purchasing lower- and upper-tier missile 
defense systems and recent overtures to work together in building a regional defense 
architecture against the Iranian ballistic missile threat.6 While the level of cooperation 
between GCC states to achieve such an integrated architecture is far from reality, these 
overtures are a significant change in tone from the 1990s when the U.S. struggled to get 
the GCC member states to agree to build an integrated air and missile early-warning 
system.       
                                                
3 Mark Landler and David E. Sanger, “Clinton Speaks of Shielding Mideast From Iran,” New York 
Times, 22 July 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/world/asia/23diplo.html.  
4 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President on Strengthening Missile 
Defense in Europe,” 17 September 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
strengthening-missile-defense-europe.  
5 “Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Report February 2010,” Department of Defense, 
http://www.defense.gov/bmdr/, 32–34. 
6 The UAE recently purchased a couple Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries; 
Saudi Arabia has PATRIOT batteries, which are currently being upgraded. Saudi Arabia has also expressed 
interest in purchasing Aegis, sea-based missile defense capabilities (Kimberly Lansdale, “Royal Saudi 
Navy CNO visits Dahlgren,” Surface Warfare, Winter 2012, 19); Kuwait has put in a request for PATRIOT 
batteries, and Qatar has agreed to host a TPY-2 X-band radar; “International Cooperation,” Missile Defense 
Agency, http://www.mda.mil/system/international_cooperation.html.  
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It is important to investigate the reasoning and calculus behind this paradigm shift 
in missile defense in order to understand the political and strategic objectives that the 
U.S. and GCC intend to gain through a regional focus. These objectives should provide a 
framework and guidance in the development and implementation of a TBMD architecture 
in the Persian Gulf region. Understanding why this missile defense option is being 
pursued is a necessary prerequisite for understanding how this complex weapon system 
will be constructed to meet the political and strategic objectives of both parties. The 
roadmap for establishing a TBMD architecture in the Middle East region starts with 
identifying these objectives.       
Once these policy and strategic aims are firmly in place and understood, the rest 
of the theater missile defense roadmap for the region can be established upon this 
foundation. A concrete plan for building this weapon system architecture in this region is 
of paramount importance, because of the three regions Washington stated that it intends 
to build TBMD systems, the Middle East represents one of the most at risk regions for 
WMD proliferation.7 Yet, despite this high-risk potential, the plan for implementing 
Middle East TBMD is the least developed. If theater missile defense is going to be sought 
as an alternative to the traditional positive security assurances of extended nuclear 
deterrence, then this mismatch of defense supply and demand needs to be rectified. The 
ability of security assurances (nuclear or non-nuclear) to be successful in preventing the 
spread of WMD hinges upon the recipient’s perceived credibility of the security 
guarantor.8 While Washington’s statements of intention to provide a “defense umbrella” 
to its Persian Gulf allies is in a sense reassuring, a concrete roadmap that identifies 
planned actions and milestones of how to achieve a missile defense architecture in the 
region would give these security assurances greater credibility and thus a greater 
likelihood of being an effective tool to prevent WMD proliferation among the Arab Gulf 
states.  
                                                
7 “Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Report February 2010,” 22–27, 31–33.  
8 Jeffrey W. Knopf, ed., Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2012), 286–87.   
 5 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The BMDR Report released in February 2010 is the most recent articulation of 
U.S. missile defense policy. With direction from the President and a mandate from 
Congress, the Secretary of Defense in conjunction with other governmental organizations 
and agencies conducted a comprehensive evaluation of U.S. policies, strategies, and 
programs concerning BMD. The resulting policy framework is more outward looking 
than previous missile defense plans in the last decade, which concentrated almost 
exclusively on homeland defense.9 While the report acknowledges the need to continue 
protecting the homeland against limited ballistic missile attack, it recommends the 
refocusing of resources towards regional threats for the expressed purposes of ensuring 
U.S. security guarantees, strengthening theater deterrence architectures, and maintaining 
a strategic balance with Russia and China.10  
The BMDR identified three at-risk regions of geo-political importance to build 
theater-based BMD architectures: Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The report sets 
forth an extensive pathway for implementing a TBMD plan in Europe known as the 
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The pathway for developing a similar 
system in Asia is less concrete; however, through the Japanese-American alliance, 
extensive layered missile defenses have been developed and implemented and serve as a 
significant starting point to broaden the architecture to other allies within the region. The 
Middle East TBMD architecture is noticeably the least developed out of the three regions 
mentioned. The BMDR discusses the on-going missile defense partnership and programs 
the U.S. has with Israel, but there is only a vague mention of working with its Persian 
Gulf allies. The report mentions building upon a Bilateral Air Defense Initiative and the 
increased interest from certain Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) states for acquiring 
BMD technologies. Despite these developments, there is not a concrete plan for how 
these arms purchases will be integrated in a larger TBMD architecture for the region, and 
there is not an equivalent partnership that mirrors the U.S.-Japan cooperation on the 
                                                
9 Specifically, there was a reduction in GMD interceptors from 44 to 30 and the cancellation of the 
third GMD site that was planned for Poland; “Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Report February 
2010,” 4–5, 15–18. 
10 Ibid., i-vii, 1–13. 
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development of layered missile defenses in the Persian Gulf that can be used as a 
stepping-stone to broaden the architecture throughout the area. While the Arabian 
Peninsula stands to be the most challenging place to implement a missile defense 
architecture, out of the three regions identified for TBMD development in the BMDR, it 
is the most threatened and strategically important region. Due to the pivotal role this area 
of the world plays in the world energy market, its security and stability is of interest to 
the entire international community, not the United States alone. This thesis aims to fill 
this gap the BMDR leaves in developing a concrete vision for TBMD within this 
threatened and unstable region.11  
The BMDR’s gap in addressing a robust TBMD architecture with the GCC 
countries is also reflected in the majority of the literature written pertaining to missile 
defense since the end of the Cold War. The literature during the 1990s and early 2000s, 
when the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT) was still in effect, can be categorized 
into five main subject areas: 
• The technical capability of missile defense in general (homeland and/or 
regional) and whether or not the cost of investing in the technology would 
result in a system that could provide adequate protection against ballistic 
missile attacks12 
                                                
11 Ibid., 19–34.  
12 Literature pertaining to subject area #1 includes: Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman, Nuclear 
Deterrence in a Regional Context (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995), 46–48; James J. Wirtz, Counterforce and 
Theater Missile Defense: Can the Army Use an ASW Approach to the Scud Hunt (Carlisle Barracks: 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995), 1–19; Daniel Goure, Charting a Path for U.S. 
Missile Defenses: Technical and Policy Issues (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 2000), 8–13; Keith B. Payne, Missile Defense in the 21st Century: Protection Against Limited 
Threats Including Lessons from the Gulf War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 13–25, 139–152; Michael 
D. Swaine, Rachel M. Swanger, and Takashi Kawakami, Japan Ballistic Missile Defense (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 2001), 1–10, 23–28; “Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture Options for the 
Asia-Pacific Region,” Department of Defense, 1999, 1–15; Robert W. Stanley II, Attacking the Mobile 
Ballistic Missile Threat in the Post-Cold War Environment: New Rules to an Old Game (Maxwell Air 
Force Base: Air University Press, 2006),  1–4, 37–50. 
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• The balance between national missile defenses (NMD) and theater missile 
defenses (TMD)13 
• The feasibility of developing missile defense technologies within the 
constraints of the ABMT14 
• The debate of whether to withdraw from the ABMT15  
• Preventing WMD proliferation through arms-control regulations like the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and other diplomatic 
agreements like the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).16   
The literature throughout the 1990s also reflects the policy debate over what 
direction to take missile defense. The Reagan Administration’s Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI), which focused on protecting the homeland against a large-scale ballistic 
missile attack from Russia, dominated missile defense policy and strategy in the 1980s. 
Shortly after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, President George H.W. Bush ordered a review 
of the SDI. The findings of the review were completed in March 1990, and it reflected 
Washington’s realization of the changed security environment characterized by ballistic 
missile and WMD proliferation to third world countries. The final report proposed a 
missile defense system that would protect the homeland against limited ICBM attacks, 
but included a new emphasis on theater defenses against short-range threats that had been 
absent from the SDI program. The new system was called Global Protection Against 
Limited Strikes (GPALS). The theater focus of the system was meant to protect both 
deployed overseas forces as well as allies. GPALS included three integrated components 
                                                
13 Literature pertaining to subject area #2 includes: Wilkening and Watman, Nuclear Deterrence in a 
Regional Context, 46–48, 63–5; Goure, Charting a Path for U.S. Missile Defenses: Technical and Policy 
Issues, 15–17; Payne, Missile Defense in the 21st Century: Protection Against Limited Threats Including 
Lessons from the Gulf War, 139–157; Navy Studies Board, Naval Forces’ Capability for Theater Missile 
Defense (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2001), 15–24, 39–93; Stanley II, Attacking the 
Mobile Ballistic Missile Threat in the Post-Cold War Environment: New Rules to an Old Game, 37–50, 54–
57.  
14 Literature pertaining to subject area #3 includes: Wilkening and Watman, 46–48, 63–5, and Goure, 
13–14. 
15 Literature pertaining to subject area #4 includes: Payne, 155–57; Goure, 13–14, 18–19.    
16 Literature pertaining to subject area #5 includes: Seth W. Carus, Ballistic Missiles in Modern 
Conflict (New York, Praeger/Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991), 53–68; Martin S. 
Navias, “Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World,” Adelphi Papers 252, The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, 1990, 61–72; Martin S. Navias, Going Ballistic: The Build-up of Missiles in the 
Middle East (London: Brassey’s (UK) Ltd., 1993), 192–230.   
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of layered defenses: a space-based system of interceptors, ground and sea-based theater 
missile defenses, and a limited, ground-based system for homeland protection. This 
conceptualized version of theater and national missile defenses is similar to the current 
phased adaptive approaches being proposed with the only major difference being the 
absence of the space-based interceptors.17 
The First Gulf War demonstrated to the United States and its allies the reality of 
the new, post-Cold War security environment. The Iraqi SCUD missile attacks against 
Israel and Saudi Arabia were evidence of the genuine threat ballistic missile proliferation 
to third world countries posed in the new world order. In the book Missile Defense in the 
21st Century: Protection Against Limited Threats Including Lessons from the Gulf War, 
Keith B. Payne uses the incidence of the First Gulf War to argue that the U.S. 
government should refocus its missile defense policy towards regional threats, and that 
the SDI and ABMT were relics of the Cold War. He believed the GPALS theater-based 
missile defense system was the correct pathway forward, and that such a system would 
bring regional stability to the Middle East, as well as other regions faced with ballistic 
missile threats. While Payne uses the events that took place in the Middle East during the 
First Gulf War to support the policy and strategic shift to the regional-level, he does not 
go beyond arguing TMD is the correct focus. He does not provide guidance on how to 
overcome the challenges of establishing such a system in the Middle East or elsewhere.18  
 At the time the GPALS program was announced and Payne’s book was written, 
TMD technologies were still in the conceptual stage; the only deployed, regional-based 
active missile defense was the Army’s Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept On 
Target (PATRIOT) system. There were politicians and academics that doubted the 
capability and feasibility of employing TMD systems, and they believed a NMD system 
held better prospects against ballistic missile threats and would be a better investment of 
resources. This debate over the focus of missile defense, regional or national, was 
ongoing throughout 1990s with NMD eventually overshadowing TMD when President 
William J. Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Act in 1999. The 
                                                
17 “Missile Defense: the First Sixty Years,” Missile Defense Agency, 15 August 2008, www.mda.mil.  
18 Payne, 1–12, 153–58. 
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recommendations for handling the regional ballistic missile threat to deployed forces and 
allies that remained centered on developing attack operations (preemptive strike) and 
passive defenses due to the skepticism of whether or not active defenses were a viable 
technology at the time.19 Entities such as the U.S. Army War College, Air University, 
Center for Asia Pacific Policy, and the Department of Defense were producing studies 
that were supportive of utilizing active defenses in an integrated, layered architecture; 
however, this research centered on the European and Asian regions with little to no 
mention of analogous systems in the Middle East theater.20 With the exception of 
Payne’s book, the literature that discussed the ballistic missile threat to the Middle East 
region typically concluded with policy recommendations that emphasized arms control 
regimes and diplomatic agreements, like the NPT, as a means to combat the danger. The 
only exceptions to this claim were a few articles and a book written by Israeli defense 
analysts. In 1997, Uzi Rubin contributed an article to the RUSI Journal that made a 
similar argument that Payne did about the significant threat of ballistic missile 
proliferation in the Middle East. Rubin’s article is more focused on the stability that 
TMD with active defenses could specifically bring to the Middle East than Payne’s book; 
however, like Payne, Rubin does not go into how such a defense system could be 
effectively employed in the region. Additionally, Arieh Stav wrote the book The Threat 
of Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East: Active Defense and Counter-Measures; however, 
despite the title of the book, it is entirely written from the Israeli point of view and 
                                                
19 The initial concept of ballistic missile defense focused on four pillars that were fused together to 
form a ballistic missile defense system (BMDS). The four pillars were active defense (interceptor missiles), 
attack operations (sometimes referred to as counterforce defense, which refers to preemptive/first strike 
operations), command and control, and passive defense (warning, protection, and hardening). “Missile 
Defense: the First Sixty Years,” www.mda.mil; Wilkening and Watman, 39–51, 63–63; Wirtz, 
Counterforce and Theater Missile Defense, 1–19. 
20 Swaine, Swanger, and Kawakami, Japan Ballistic Missile Defense, 1–10, 23–39; “Report to 
Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture Options for the Asia-Pacific Region,” Department of 
Defense, 1–15; Axel Schmidt and Frits Verschuur, “European Theater Missile Defense Program: A Field 
for International Cooperation” (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1997), 21–35. 
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pertains only to Israeli defense against ballistic missile threats, not the entire Middle 
East.21  
Since TBMD systems are a response to counter the spread of WMD to third world 
states, literature pertaining to nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation was also reviewed 
due to its applicability to the topic. Ballistic missile defense is often analyzed through a 
realist lens in a similar manner that the closely related topics of nuclear strategy and 
proliferation are examined. During the Cold War, conclusions and policies concerning 
nuclear strategy, proliferation, and the role of missile defense were often predicated upon 
the state-level of analysis where security and power formed the cornerstone of the state’s 
national interest, and arms control and security assurances were the chosen policies to 
contain the threat of nuclear proliferation. Since the end of the Cold War and dissolution 
of the bipolar international system, rational deterrence theory struggles to completely 
explain the new world order of rogue states and non-state actors. In Tanya Ogilvie-
White’s article “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the 
Contemporary Debate,” she notes that nuclear proliferation explanations have been 
predominately viewed through the realist perspective focusing on external pressures to 
the state. Ogilvie-White points out that states face a “double security dilemma” that 
involves internal and external threats to their stability that effect their decision-making: 
“Domestic concerns––political stability, social cohesion, economic strength, 
environmental well-being, and technological development––would perhaps be factored in 
with more traditional strategic concerns about the existence of adversaries, the reliability 
of alliances, and the distribution of power in the international system.”22 These 
observation made about nuclear proliferation are reflected in the aforementioned BMD 
literature, which focuses on countering the external threat and the impact on strategic 
                                                
21 Carus, Ballistic Missiles in Modern Conflict, 53–68; Navias, “Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the 
Third World,” 61–72; Navias, Going Ballistic: The Build-up of Missiles in the Middle East, 192–230; Uzi 
Rubin, “Missiles and Missile Defence in the Middle East: A Regional View,” RUSI Journal, October 1997, 
74–5; Arieh Stav, ed., The Threat of Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East: Active Defense and Counter-
Measure (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2011).   
22 Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Is there a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the 
Contemporary Debate,” The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1996, 48. 
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balance.23 In addition to external threats, an examination of the domestic politics of the 
regions the U.S. plans to implement TBMD systems should be conducted.24   
The BMDR states that one of the intended outcomes of the policy and strategy it 
set forth is to underwrite security guarantees to allies. This plan to utilize missile defenses 
to bolster security assurances that have been supported through extended nuclear 
deterrence since the beginning of the Cold War, suggests that BMD may be part of the 
solution to the mounting policy dilemma created by positive and negative security 
assurances and arms reduction commitments that academics and policy makers have been 
pointing out for the last two decades. Jeffrey Knopf investigates the relationship between 
nuclear proliferation and security assurances in his book Security Assurances and 
Nuclear Nonproliferation. Knopf highlights several case studies to attempt to understand 
the conditions under which positive or negative security assurances are effective at 
preventing countries from acquiring or abandoning nuclear weapon programs. In his 
analysis of these case studies, Knopf examines domestic factors that may have pushed 
states in either direction, and concludes that the success or failure of security assurances 
is situational dependent, so it is hard to propose all-encompassing, fail-safe policies. 
However, he does acknowledge there are a few things that seem to be prevalent across 
the board when it comes to security assurance success stories. He finds that credibility 
between provider and recipient is important, as well as tailoring the assurance to the 
recipient’s security environment. It is also suggested that security assurances are best 
offered as part of a larger strategy that involves positive incentives, which include 
strengthening of political and economic ties, as well as improving defense cooperation 
and consultation. Despite these findings, Knopf argues that continuing to provide positive 
security assurances in the form of extended deterrence guarantees requires the U.S. to 
                                                
23 The following literature is in addition to the literature already cited that focuses on threat capability 
and strategic balance, Tom Sauer, Eliminating Nuclear Weapons: Role of Missile Defense (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011), 39–108; Dean Wilkening, “A Simple Model for Calculating Ballistic 
Missile Defense Effectiveness,” Science and Global Security, 1999, Volume 8:2, pp. 183–215; Dean 
Wilkening, “How Much Ballistic Missile Defense Is Enough?” Center for International Security and 
Cooperation, Stanford University, October, 1998, 1–38.  
24 Ogilvie-White, “Is there a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary 
Debate,” 43–60; Paul Gordon Lauren, Gordon A. Craig, and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft, 4th 
ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 175–180.   
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maintain its nuclear weapons at the ready, which makes negative assurances to non-
nuclear states appear disingenuous. James Russell makes a similar assessment of this 
policy dilemma in his article “Extended Deterrence, Security Guarantees and Nuclear 
Weapons: U.S. Strategic and Policy Conundrums in the Gulf.” Russell points to Secretary 
Clinton’s remarks about extending a “defense umbrella” to the U.S. GCC allies, and how 
if this umbrella is a nuclear one, then such assertions are incongruent with the multilateral 
commitments the U.S. has to reduce its nuclear arms.25  
If the solution to this policy dilemma is utilizing non-nuclear options like BMD 
systems, then the credibility and tailored nature of assurances that Knopf mentions will 
need to be applied to this new defense umbrella. While security assurances have been 
policy prescription of the realist school of thought, Knopf breaks down the interests of 
different states to accept or reject certain security arrangements. Through the case studies 
he looks at the inner motivations of the leaders of states and their relationship to other 
domestic institutions to add to a fuller understanding of what mechanisms, other than 
external threats, construct states’ interests. Taking the level of analysis down to the 
individual or unit level and examining social and psychological perspectives allows for 
better predictions and explanations concerning the complex dynamics of nuclear 
proliferation.26 
This literature review demonstrates a gap in the development of a concrete 
roadmap for building a TBMD architecture in the Persian Gulf region. There is also a 
tendency to frame WMD proliferation and missile defense solely in terms of the external 
pressures states experience. Therefore, examining the internal dynamics that equally form 
states’ interests and decision-making processes can produce a fuller understanding of 
TBMD evolution and provide guidance for successfully implementing missile defenses 
within a coalition structure in the Persian Gulf.   
                                                
25Knopf, Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1–7, 286–89; James Russell, “Extended 
Deterrence, Security Guarantees and Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Strategic and Policy Conundrums in the 
Gulf,” Perspectives on Extended Deterrence, Foundation pour la Recherche Strategique, Recherches & 
Documents No. 03/2010,67–8, 75–7.  
26 Knopf, 89–268; Ogilvie-White, 48, 53–4.  
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D. METHODOLOGY  
This thesis uses a comparative case study analysis of the three regions identified 
in the “BMDR Report” that the United States is committed to defending against ballistic 
missile threats: Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Since America’s European and 
Asian allies are considerably further along in their missile defense programs than its 
Persian Gulf partners, they provide valuable lessons learned from similar challenges that 
the GCC may encounter as it begins to acquire integrated missile defense capabilities. 
More importantly, the differences within these regions will impact how phased adaptive 
approaches are implemented to fit each region’s particular circumstances. These 
differences include threat capability, range, and volume, as well as how the countries 
within these regions cooperate with one another and with the United States. Due to these 
variations, the “BMDR Report” emphasizes the importance of preventing a ‘one size fits 
all’ mentality: “In short, the foundations for applying phased adaptive approaches in 
these regions are different, and thus so too are the pathways forward.”27 Through this 
comparative method of analysis, a tailored pathway forward for implementing a phased 
adaptive approach to missile defense can be developed to meet the threats, interests, and 
abilities of the United States’ Persian Gulf partners.   
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is structured into five chapters, with the first chapter addressing the 
motivations and incentives for the U.S. and its GCC partners to embrace a TBMD 
approach to countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats within the Persian 
Gulf region. These objectives will serve as guiding principles for the development and 
implementation of the phased adaptive approach, which are discussed in subsequent 
chapters.  
Chapters III through V consist of the comparative analysis between the three 
different regions with the emphasis being on the Persian Gulf. Chapter III examines the 
European and Asian missile defense initiatives. The nature of the threats, alliances, 
strategic balances, and previous collaborations on missile defense within these regions 
                                                
27 “BMDR Report,” 25. 
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are analyzed. Chapters IV and V comprise the Persian Gulf case study with Chapter IV 
focusing on the nature the Iranian threat, and Chapter V concentrating on the internal 
dynamics of the GCC states and their alliances with one another and the United States. 
This chapter will also examine previous collaborative defense initiatives and their 
outcomes in the region.  
The concluding chapter will provide policy recommendations based on the 
analysis from the previous chapters. These recommendations will include proposed 
TBMDS elements and where they should be stationed based off of political-military 
dynamics and capacities within the GCC states, as well as measures to be taken to 
integrate these efforts across the entire alliance. Lastly, critical issues are presented that 
will need to be addressed in order to ensure that a missile defense phased adaptive 
approach provides stability and credible deterrence within the region.  
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II. MOTIVATIONS AND INCENTIVES 
This chapter analyzes the motivations and incentives for the United States and its 
GCC partners to embrace a TBMD approach to countering (WMD) threats within the 
Persian Gulf region. The first section reviews the evolution of ballistic missile defense in 
order to provide context for the recent shift in U.S. policy towards TBMD. Included in 
this section is an overview of the current TBMD construct, the phased adaptive approach, 
and the technical components and their capabilities that comprise this layered defense 
system. The second section discusses the relevance of implementing a TBMD 
architecture in the Persian Gulf, the objectives and interests of U.S. allies in the region, 
and the benefits and challenges of pursuing such an initiative. 
A. THE SHIFT TO THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
Employing active missile defenses is not a new idea. Its origins lie within WWII 
and countering the threat of German V-2’s against Western European allies. Its evolution 
also has to be understood within the larger context of the development of nuclear strategy 
from the Manhattan Project to the New START.  
1. A Brief History of Nuclear Strategy and Ballistic Missile Defense 
Evolution 
As the Manhattan Project worked towards building the first nuclear weapons, the 
lesser-known Project Thumper sought methods of defending deployed forces against the 
new ballistic missile threat.28 Active missile defense is a component of nuclear strategy, 
and it has had to contend with the offensive side since Fat Man and Little Boy were 
dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in August 1945. The unproven concept of creating a 
shield to defend against a barrage of nearly impossible-to-detect projectiles was pitted 
against the successfully demonstrated, awe-inspiring destructiveness of a single atomic 
bomb. Thus, from the beginning of the nuclear age, offensive and defensive capabilities 
                                                
28 Richard Dean Burns and Lester H. Brune, The Quest for Missile Defenses (Claremont: Regina 
Books, 2003), 15. 
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have constituted something of a sibling rivalry with the offense gaining favor and 
eventually coming to dominate the character of Cold War nuclear strategy and policy.  
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara elevated the approach of allowing the 
U.S. and U.S.S.R. to utilize their offensive nuclear arsenals to target each other’s 
population centers while at the same time attempting to limit offensive and defensive 
systems. Mutually assured destruction (MAD) and arms control became the cornerstone 
of U.S. nuclear strategy from the 1960s to the end of the Cold War. Undoubtedly, MAD 
was a terrifying balance to accept, but it was nonetheless a balance that seemed to hold 
the strongest potential for providing stability within the international system at a time 
when it was desperately needed to stop the spiraling and destabilizing offensive-
defensive, action-reaction cycle of an arms race. With the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty, missile defense was sidelined in order to preserve this balance. Lawrence 
Freedman summarizes this strategy in his book The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy: “The 
formula for stabilizing the arms race could be summed up as: ‘Offence good, defence 
bad; killing cities good; killing missiles bad.’ This was not based on timeless and 
universal values but the circumstances of the moment.”29 While it was concluded during 
the latter half of the twentieth century that effective missile defenses were a destabilizing, 
as well as dubious endeavor, the changed strategic environment since the break-up of the 
Soviet Union presents serious challenges to these long-established Cold War foundations 
of stability.30   
The Reagan Administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in the 1980s was 
evidence that while MAD and arms control were the established mainstays of Cold War 
nuclear strategy, there were those who were not content to live indefinitely with the 
“balance of terror” created by these policies and strategies. Furthermore, there was a 
belief that as long as nuclear weapons existed, their use was inevitable. The SDI 
program’s focus on protecting the homeland against a large-scale ballistic missile attack 
from Russia through the use of space-based interceptors and lasers was largely criticized 
                                                
29 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003), 242.  
30 Ibid., 232–242; Burns and Brune, The Quest for Missile Defenses, 24–28; Sauer, Eliminating 
Nuclear Weapons, 1–18. 
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for being technologically premature and upsetting the stability of twenty years worth of 
arms control negotiations. However, the waning Soviet power and rising proliferation of 
ballistic missiles and WMD to the third world that accompanied the abrupt end to the 
Cold War caused President George H.W. Bush to scale down and refocus the SDI 
program to meet the needs of the changed security environment. His revised missile 
defense system, Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS), was to protect the 
homeland against limited ICBM attacks from accidental or unauthorized release, and 
have a greater emphasis on defending against short-range theater ballistic missiles that 
threatened allies and deployed forces. It was believed this new layered missile defense 
system that consisted of space, ground, and sea-based based interceptors could be 
achieved within the constraints of the ABM Treaty.31  
As the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, so too began the dissolution of the bi-polar world 
and delicate “balance of terror” that had been constructed around it. The end of the Cold 
War ushered in an array of predictions of the new world order and what it would mean 
for stability in the international system.32 The intra-state, ethnic-driven conflict, terrorist 
attacks, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were the challenges that 
came to dominate the opening of the post-Cold War era. The proliferation of WMD to 
unstable, third world regimes that often had objectives that seemed to be incongruent 
with prevailing international norms and standards, as well as the possibility that sub-state, 
violent extremist organizations could gain access to such weapons, seriously challenged 
the assumptions and application of nuclear deterrence to the realities of the new strategic 
environment. The First Gulf War demonstrated to the United States and its allies this 
dilemma. The Iraqi SCUD missile attacks against Israel and Saudi Arabia were evidence 
of the genuine threat ballistic missile proliferation to third world countries posed in this 
new world order.33 
                                                
31 Burns and Brune, 82–97, 101–7,120–23, 131–38, 143–48; Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear 
Strategy, 391–400. 
32 In reference to pieces by Frances Fukuyama (“The End of History?”), John J. Mearsheimer (“Why 
We Will Soon Miss the Cold War”), and Samuel P. Huntington (“The Clash of Civilizations?”) as reprinted 
in Richard K. Betts, Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, 3rd ed. (New 
York: Pearson-Longman, 2008), 6–51.  
33 Freedman, 407–57; Payne, Missile Defense in the 21st Century, 139–57.  
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The inability of nuclear deterrence to address the complex and evolving 
challenges of the changing strategic environment in the 1990s led President William J. 
Clinton to initially continue the theater-focused approach to missile defense that the Bush 
I Administration started. However, facing a Republican-controlled Congress that was 
skeptical of the complete Soviet collapse and reluctant to accept new threats to national 
security that lay within Third World and non-state organizations, Clinton was forced to 
shift the main focus of missile defense back to the strategic realm due to this political 
pressure. Intelligence overestimates of WMD development by the so-called rogue nations 
(Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya), and North Korea’s launching of its Taepo Dong-1 
(TD-1) missile in August 1998 put immense pressure on the Clinton Administration to 
deploy a NMD system and amend or withdraw from the ABM Treaty.34 Clinton signed 
the National Missile Defense Act in 1999,35 and his successor George W. Bush 
accelerated the deployment of a NMD system during his terms in office due to the events 
of 9–11, the “war on terror,” and the formulation of the “axis of evil” that resulted in 
feelings of increased insecurity at home. The U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty in 
2002, deployment of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system in 2005,36 and 
the use of preventative attack against Iraq in 2003 was President Bush’s response to the 
perceived growth in theater and homeland threats.37 
                                                
34 Burns and Brune, 163–165; While North Korea’s TD-1 test flight in 1998 out performed U.S. 
intelligence estimates in range, it did not achieve its intended goal of placing a satellite into orbit due to a 
third stage booster failure. Additionally, it was believed that North Korea did not yet have the technology 
required to develop sophisticated guidance systems or reentry vehicles that could carry nuclear warheads.  
35 This legislation advocated building a NMD system as soon as technologically possible and 
amending to the ABM Treaty to accommodate its deployment. Due to failed missile tests, delayed 
programs, and criticism against the alteration of the ABM Treaty terms, Clinton deferred the decision to 
deploy a NMD system to his successor George W. Bush; Burns and Brune, 153–180, Missile Defense 
Agency, “Missile Defense: the First Sixty Years,” 15 August 2008, www.mda.mil; 16–17. 
36 The GMD program initially called for the deployment of 44 ground-based, conventionally armed 
interceptors at two sites in the U.S., and an additional site with 10 interceptors stationed in Poland to hedge 
against an Iranian threat to NATO allies; Department of Defense, “Ballistic Missile Defense Review 
(BMDR) February 2010,” 15–18; Burns and Brune, 208–11.  
37 Burns and Brune, 153–214; Kenneth P. Werrell, “Hitting a Bullet with a Bullet: A History of 
Ballistic Missile Defense,” Airpower Research Institute, 2000, 41–65. 
 19 
2. The Paradigm Shift to Theater Missile Defense  
At the end of the Bush Administration, missile defense was decidedly oriented 
towards the homeland, but shortly after the inauguration of President Barack Obama in 
January 2009, a dramatic shift back towards theater-level missile defense occurred. A 
combination of circumstances brought about this shift to regional missile defense. First, 
the latter Bush Administration’s GMD program became plagued with failures and delays 
and faced criticism for its rushed deployment.38 Conversely, theater missile defense 
programs were experiencing unprecedented success with THAAD, Aegis BMD, and 
PAC-3 showing increased capabilities against more sophisticated targets.39  
Second, pursuing an NMD system designed to defeat a limited strike from rogue 
nations or accidental launches became increasingly disingenuous, as the ICBM threat 
from rogue states did not materialize as quickly as originally projected, and stability 
within Russia and China made an accidental launch seem highly unlikely.40 The threat 
was and still is at the theater level. Thus, it made sense to rebalance missile defense 
efforts to protect regional allies and deployed forces against existing short- and medium-
range ballistic missile threats. Additionally, given the negative consequences of 
launching a preventative war into a third world country, which had only increased 
regional instability, the United States sought a defensive deterrence strategy that included 
military and non-military tools to counter the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD. 
Third, the strategic implications of pursing even a limited NMD system worried 
Russia and China and threatened the United States’ ability to continue further arms 
reduction negotiations. While shifting the focus to the theater level has not completely 
alleviated these concerns, it puts the United States in a stronger position to convince 
Russia and China that its missile defense efforts are not aimed at diminishing their 
strategic deterrents, but rather the common threat to all parties of WMD proliferators.  
                                                
38Burns and Brune, 208–211, Sauer, 43–45.   
39 Burns and Brune, 200–8, Sauer, 43–6, 50–55.  
40 Burns and Brune, 160–3.  
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Fourth, the present U.S. administration’s decision to take accelerated measures to 
disarm and deemphasize its reliance upon nuclear weapons while still intending to 
maintain alliance security guarantees, necessitates alternative means by which to fulfill 
these assurances.   President Obama’s April 2009 speech in Prague declared that during 
his term in office, the United States would make concerted efforts towards nuclear 
elimination: “I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace 
and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”41 While he acknowledged this 
ambitious goal may not be achieved within his lifetime, he declared that steps during his 
administration would be taken to move the world towards a reality free from nuclear 
threats, which he claimed had only grown with the end of the Cold War and reduction of 
nuclear armaments. These sentiments are reiterated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review 
and the signing of the New START in 2010 between the United States and Russia, which 
held both nuclear powers to limiting their arsenals to 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads 
apiece.42  
Consequently, the overall non-proliferation regime is bolstered as the nuclear 
powers reduce their arsenals. Making concerted efforts towards nuclear elimination 
through continued arms reductions upholds the United States’ and Russia’s obligations as 
nuclear weapon states under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to 
make progress towards nuclear disarmament. Meeting their Article VI requirements 
strengthens Washington and Moscow’s position in insisting that non-nuclear states meet 
their obligations not to acquire nuclear weapons.43 However, as America meets its 
commitment to reduce nuclear weapons, it may be challenging the long-established U.S. 
practice of offering extended nuclear deterrence to allies as a way to assure them that 
                                                
41 “President Obama’s Speech on Nuclear Weapons,” Prague: 5 April 2009 in Sauer, Eliminating 
Nuclear Weapons: The Role of Missile Defense, 113.  
42 U.S. Department of State Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, “New 
START,” http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf; This was a reduction from the 1700–
2200 deployed warheads agreed upon in the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), U.S. 
Department of State Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, “Treaty Between the 
United States of America and the Russian Federation On Strategic Offensive Reductions (The Moscow 
Treaty),” 24 May 2002, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/10527.htm.  
43 Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” April 2010, 
http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf, v-vi. 
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they do not need to develop their own nuclear arsenals.44 It is not by coincidence that 
President Obama mentioned missile defense in his Prague speech and the Nuclear Posture 
Review; because five months after signing the New START, he announced the European 
Phased Adaptive Approach missile defense initiative. Shifting missile defense efforts to 
the theater level is a way of continuing positive security assurances to allies as the United 
States reduces the salience of its nuclear arsenal and continues to disarm. Thus, theater 
BMD is a possible solution to the mounting policy dilemma created by positive and 
negative security assurances and arms reduction commitments.  
The Cold War strategy of nuclear deterrence presents less of a solution to the 
security challenges of today’s international system. As the offense gained favor during 
the Cold War and came to dominate nuclear strategy, it is evident that in the present post-
Cold War era that the balance is recalibrating towards the defense. Nuclear strategies 
such as MAD are no longer viewed as the stabilizing mechanisms they once were and, as 
some would argue, such approaches have become destabilizing forces that can stimulate 
nuclear proliferation.45  In addition to decreasing the relevance of nuclear deterrence, the 
other Cold War mechanism of stability, arms control, has evolved into arms reduction. As 
the current U.S. administration comes to deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons and 
moves from a policy of mutually assured destruction to one of mutually assured 
security,46 the defense is gaining ascendancy over the offense, and non-nuclear options 
like BMD will increasingly dominate the post-Cold War era. This evolution in policy and 
strategy along with the successful technological advances made in theater missile defense 
systems and the attempt to allay Russian and Chinese concerns over U.S. missile defense 
developments by focusing capabilities towards countering shared regional threats,47 
                                                
44 Russell, “Extended Deterrence, Security Guarantees and Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Strategic and 
Policy Conundrums in the Gulf,” 67–8, 75–7. 
45 Sauer, 105; Knopf ed., Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1–7, 286–89.   
46 Freedman, 414–418. 
47 This effort to assuage Russian and Chinese fears of U.S. missile defense being aimed at their 
strategic arsenals has thus far been unsuccessful. Moscow and Beijing are still skeptical that America’s 
TBMD intentions completely negate broader NMD ambitions, and these apprehensions are still the greatest 
political obstacle to fully implementing phased adaptive approaches in Europe and Asia.  
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explains the shift in U.S. policy towards theater-level missile defense in cooperation with 
regional allies.  
3. The Phased Adaptive Approach 
The phased adaptive approach the United States has adopted as its framework for 
implementing regional BMD architectures promotes strong partnerships with allies to 
address emerging ballistic missile threats. The concept is to build a system where new 
missile technologies are incorporated into each stage to counter the projected threat. The 
time period over which the entire system is implemented is intended to be realistic in the 
ability to develop, test, deploy, and finance the technology to counter the predicted threat 
before it is capable of effectively targeting deployed forces and allies. This concept is 
also flexible in the sense that all new missile technologies being developed are mobile. 
Defense experts and policy makers realize that the demand for these missile technologies 
will exceed the supply initially. Therefore, developing missile technologies that can be 
relocated and concentrated in troubled regions during a political-military crisis is a key 
feature of this phased adaptive approach. Additionally, technological burden-sharing is 
also encouraged with this approach as a way to defray costs, encourage allies to take 
ownership of their defense, and ensure that architectures meet the needs and capabilities 
of a region.48    
4. Theater Ballistic Missile Defense System Components 
The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) is predicated on an integrated and 
layered architecture of sensors, interceptors, and command and control nodes. The system 
has to be able to counter ballistic missiles that have a variety of ranges, speeds, sizes, and 
performance characteristics. There are four main stages in a ballistic missile’s trajectory: 
boost, ascent, midcourse, and terminal. The objective of the BMDS is to target a threat 
missile at each stage of its flight path, thus providing multiple opportunities to shoot 
                                                
48 “BMDR Report,” 19–28.  
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down an incoming ballistic missile (known as a “shoot-look-shoot” tactic) and increasing 
the success of neutralizing the threat.49 
Currently, the BMDS has sensors that are capable of detecting, tracking, and 
discriminating ballistic missile threats through all phases of trajectory. Regional BMDS 
architectures would include the following sensors: Space Tracking and Surveillance 
System (STSS), Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX), Land Based Transportable Radar 
Surveillance (TPY-2), and the Aegis SPY-1 Radar. STSS is a satellite constellation that 
utilizes infrared and visible light to detect the boost phase of a ballistic missile and 
provides accurate track data on midcourse re-entry vehicles to shooters. This is the first 
line of defense in the BMDS. Once STSS detects a ballistic launch, it relays this 
information to other ground- and sea-based sensors and shooters. SBX is an X-band radar 
mounted on a ocean-going, semi-submersible oil drilling platform that can acquire, track 
and discriminate ballistic missiles and provide this information to inceptor platforms. 
There is only one SBX sensor that has been continuously deployed in the Pacific Ocean 
to serve the Asian theater and testing and evaluation. In theory, it could service other 
regions; however, with a speed of eight knots, a decision to move it to another theater has 
to be made well in advance of the expected threat. The AN/TPY-2 is a land-based, 
transportable X-band radar that is phased array and high resolution. This sensor can 
detect ballistic missiles early in flight and provide precise tracking information to 
interceptors; it also provides fire control support for the Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defense (THAAD) weapon system. Eight TPY-2’s have been manufactured, and three 
more are currently in production. Four of the seven are currently deployed in support of 
TBMD in Japan, Turkey, and Israel with another two being sold to the United Arab 
Emirates as a part of their recent THAAD FMS acquisition. The current plan calls for 11 
TPY-2’s to be part of the BMDS. The SPY-1 is an S-band radar onboard Aegis cruisers 
and destroyers that has the ability to detect and track threat missiles and provide fire 
                                                
49 Missile Defense Agency, “Fact Sheet: The Ballistic Missile Defense System,” 
http://www.mda.mil/system/elements.html.  
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control support to the SM-3 interceptor missile.50 There are currently 26 Aegis ships 
equipped with BMD capabilities, with a plan calling for 36 BMD capable ships by 
2018.51 The Aegis-Ashore system is currently under production, and will provide the 
same capabilities as sea-based Aegis from land with the ability to relocate if necessary. 
These BMDS components provide overlapping sensor coverage throughout the entire 
ballistic missile trajectory path, making it more challenging for enemy ballistic missiles 
to penetrate the system.52 
 While the BMDS sensor coverage can track all four phases of ballistic missile 
trajectory, the ability to intercept and destroy missiles in all four phases is still a work in 
progress. The current interceptor components of the system all utilize hit-to-kill 
technology (with the exception of the sea-based terminal missile, which has a blast 
fragmentation warhead), and they have the ability to intercept ballistic missiles in the 
midcourse and terminal phases of flight. These interceptor components include: the Aegis 
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), PATRIOT 
Advanced Capability (PAC-3), and Sea Based Terminal (SM-T). The SM-3 is currently 
the only component capable of intercepting a ballistic missile in the midcourse phase of 
trajectory and thus provides the highest tier of defense. Aegis cruisers and destroyers are 
currently the only launching platforms for SM-3’s; however, when the Aegis-Ashore 
concept is fielded beginning in 2015 as part of the EPAA, there will be additional mobile, 
land-based launching platforms. THAAD has the capability of intercepting ballistic 
                                                
50 The difference between the X-band radars (SBX and TPY-2) and S-band (SPY-1) and C-band 
(PAC-3) radars is the wavelength. X-band radars have a shorter wavelength than the S-band or C-band 
radars. The shorter wavelength gives the X-band radars a higher resolution, which means they can 
discriminate the reentry vehicle (warhead) from surrounding decoys and debris. The S-band and C-band 
radars can search, track, and provide fire control for an engagement, but they cannot provide 
discrimination. They rely on cueing from X-band radars to ensure a successful engagement once the 
warhead has separated and is surrounded by decoys.   
51 MDA, “Fact Sheet: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense,” 
http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/aegis.pdf; Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile 
Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 14 
March 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf.  
52 MDA, “Fact Sheet: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense”; MDA, “Factsheet: Terminal High Altitude 
Area Defense,” http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/thaad.pdf; MDA, “Factsheet: PATRIOT 
Advanced Capability-3,” http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/pac3.pdf; MDA, “Factsheet: Space 
Tracking and Surveillance System,” http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/stss.pdf; MDA, “Factsheet: 
Army Navy/ Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2),” 
http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/an_tpy2.pdf.  
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missiles both inside and outside of the atmosphere, upon re-entry, at the beginning of the 
terminal trajectory phase. Three THAAD batteries are operationally deployable, and 
another two batteries are being manufactured for sale to the United Arab Emirates. The 
PAC-3 and SBT components are the lowest tier elements in the system that provide point 
defense of deployed forces and allies. SBT is a long-range anti-air missile (SM-2 Block 
IV) that has been converted to shoot down missiles in their terminal phase. It provides 
similar capabilities to the PAC-3, but it is sea-based on Aegis ships. These interceptor 
components provide a robust and overlapping defense against short- and medium-range 
ballistic missiles in the midcourse and terminal phases of flight. Future capabilities that 
will provide earlier intercept opportunities in the boost and ascent phases of flight are 
rigorously being developed and tested. Early Intercept (EI) and Ascent Phase Intercept 
(API) technologies will provide the ability to neutralize threat missiles in the beginning 
stages of their flight trajectories when detection is easier and prior to countermeasure 
deployment. Eliminating the threat in these early stages provides additional layers of 
protection, conserves interceptors, and mitigates the effects of terminal phase, post-
engagement debris on defended territory. All of these independent sensor and interceptor 
components are integrated through the Command, Control, Battle Management, and 
Communications (C2BMC) system that acts as the central hub for the BMDS. C2BMC 
provides situational awareness of missile threats, a common operating picture for 
decision makers, and weapon system resource management and integration.53      
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the TBMD sensor and interceptor capabilities. The 
layer column in Table 2 denotes whether the interceptor is endo-atmospheric (lower-tier) 
or exo-atmospheric (upper-tier). The threat column in Table 2 denotes the type of ballistic 
missile the interceptor can engage. In principle, an interceptor with a higher altitude 
capability will be able to defend a larger area. Longer-range and faster speed interceptor 
capabilities allow for defense against longer-range ballistic missile threats.  
                                                
53 MDA, “Potential New Technologies,” 
http://www.mda.mil/system/potential_new_technologies.html; MDA, “Fact Sheet: Command, Control, 
Battle Management, and Communications,” http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/c2bmc.pdf; MDA, 
“Factsheet: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense”; MDA, “Fact Sheet: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense”; 
MDA, “Factsheet: PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3.” 
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Table 1.   TBMD Sensor Capabilities 
Sensor Location Search Track  Discriminate Coverage 
STSS Space X X X Continuous 
SBX Sea X X X Temporary 
TPY-2 Land/mobile X X X Temporary 
SPY-1 Sea/land* X X   Temporary 
*SPY-1 will have land-based components once Aegis-Ashore units are deployed. 
Source: Missile Defense Agency, www.mda.mil. 
 
Table 2.   TMD Interceptor Capabilities 
Interceptor Location Layer Phase  Threat  
PAC-2/3 Land/mobile Lower Terminal SR 
SBT Sea Lower Terminal  SR 
THAAD Land/mobile Upper/Lower Terminal  SR/MR 
Aegis SM-3 Sea/Land* Upper Midcourse SR/MR/IR** 
 *SM-3 will have land-based components once Aegis-Ashore units are deployed. 
 **SM-3 IB has limited and IIA, IIB will have full IRBM capabilities.  
 Source: Missile Defense Agency, www.mda.mil. 
 
B. THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE PERSIAN GULF   
Producing roughly 30 percent of the world’s oil and holding over two-thirds of its 
proven oil reserves (approximately 786 billion barrels),54 the geo-political importance of 
the Persian Gulf is firmly rooted in this vital energy source making it to the global 
market. Americans and other industrialized countries experienced the crippling effects of 
energy crises that came as a result of the disruption of oil from this region during the 
1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1979 Iranian Revolution.55 While the United States has 
reduced its dependence on oil from the region, the growing Asian economies are now the 
                                                
54 International Energy Agency, “2012 Key World Energy Statistics,” www.iea.org, 10; Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, “OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves 2011,” 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm.  
55 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the  Arab-Israeli Conflict, 7th ed. (New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s: 
2010), 321; “OPEC Oil Embargo, 1973–1974,” U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1969–1976/OPEC;  “Petroleum Chronology of Events: Iranian 




Middle East’s biggest oil customer. For example, China gets over half of its oil from the 
Persian Gulf region.56 Regardless of who is the largest customer of Arab oil, due to 
globalization and the industrialization of developing countries, any future disruption in 
oil from this region would be devastating to the entire world economy. The demand for 
oil is increasing and will continue to increase as more nations industrialize, and with the 
bulk of the world’s proven and easily accessible oil reserves, the Persian Gulf region will 
fulfill this demand for the foreseeable future. Due to the critical role that this region plays 
in the global economy, its stability is of paramount importance to the entire international 
community.57  
Since inheriting the role of chief security guarantor in the Persian Gulf from the 
British in the 1970s, the United States’ prime concern has been energy security in this 
highly volatile region. Initially, Washington implemented a “twin pillar” policy of 
establishing diplomatic relations with both the Saudis and the Iranians to ensure regional 
stability was maintained in order to secure its energy interests. This arrangement came to 
an end in 1979 when the Iranian Revolution overthrew the U.S.-supported regime. The 
new government established an anti-Western theocracy based on Islamic Shi’ism that 
was antagonistic towards its Sunni-ruled Gulf neighbors and the United States. With only 
one pillar remaining, Washington has strengthened its ties to the Gulf monarchs in order 
to provide a bulwark against the destabilizing influence of Iran.58  
                                                
56Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, “Country Comparison:  Oil Consumption,” 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2174rank.html; International 
Energy Agency, “2012 Key World Energy Statistics,” 30–31; Damien Ma, “Dependence on Middle Eastern 
oil: Now It’s China’s problem, Too,” The Atlantic online, 19 July 2012, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/07/dependence-on-middle-eastern-oil-now-its-
chinas-problem-too/259947/.  
57 Christopher M. Blanchard, “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional 
Research Service, November 3, 2000, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL33533, 2–6; Peter Alsis, Marissa 
Allison, and Anthony H. Cordesman, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition in the Gulf States and 
Yemen,” A Report of the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy, 16 March 2012,  
http://csis.org/files/publication/120228_Iran_Ch_VI_Gulf_State.pdf, 4; Jan H. Kalicki, “RX For ‘Oil 
Addiction’: The Middle East and Energy Security,” Middle East Policy Vol. XIV No.1, Spring 2007, 76–
78. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, “World Oil Outlook 2012” (Vienna: OPEC 
Secretariat: 2012), 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/WOO2012.pdf, 155–57.   
58 Alsis, Allison, Cordesman, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition in the Gulf States and Yemen,” 
4–6. 
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One of Iran’s main strategic priorities is to expand its influence within the Middle 
East region and Islamic world. This goal has only been bolstered since the toppling of the 
Sunni-led Iraqi regime in 2003, which had been a counter-weight to Iran’s ambitions in 
the region. Iran has acquired capabilities of asymmetric warfare, long-range missiles, and 
is possibly developing a nuclear weapon capability as a means to exert its hegemony over 
the region. This antagonistic military build-up over the past 30 years has destabilized the 
region. The United States has sought stronger ties with the Arab Gulf States to contain 
Iran’s ambitions: “As a part of its strategic partnership with the Arab Gulf states, the U.S. 
offers transfers of military weapons and technology, shares intelligence and early-
warning data, and conducts capacity-building and training programs. . .and [seeks] to 
establish a mix of U.S., Iraqi, and Gulf capabilities for deterrence and defense that will 
contain Iran.”59 While the GCC states may have been more reluctant to collaborate with 
one another on joint defense endeavors, the events of the past decade that have further 
destabilized the already fragile balance within the region and amplified the Iranian threat 
have created pliability within the GCC alliance to strengthen collective security 
arrangements. The GCC’s receptiveness to working with the United States to build a 
robust BMD system is a reflection of this shift towards greater cooperation. As both 
parties’ interests are tied to one another, pursuing TBMD in the region will support the 
strategy of Iranian containment, and provide an alternative to extended nuclear deterrence 
to reassure Gulf allies of the United States’ commitment to their security and prosperity. 
This conventional positive security assurance will contribute to the prevention of WMD 
proliferation in the region and the broader U.S. goals of Middle East peace and security.60 
1. Benefits and Drawbacks of Implementing TBMD in the Middle East 
While incorporating a TBMD system similar to the one being developed in 
Europe would enhance the deterrence objectives within the Gulf theater, there is debate 
amongst defense specialists and academics about whether approaching this TBMD 
                                                
59 Ibid., 4. 
60 Ibid., 4–5; Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Majority Staff Report, “The Gulf 
Security Architecture: A Partnership with the Gulf Cooperation Council,” U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington: 19 June 2012; 1–6.  
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focused strategy will foster cooperation or contention with allies, deter or provoke 
adversaries, or be feasible or impractical. Therefore, it is important to assess the benefits 
and challenges of pursuing such an ambitious and expensive program within a region that 
has its own unique set of security challenges. 
The possible benefits of pursing a phased adaptive approach in the Persian Gulf 
region include:  
• Providing deterrence and defense against Iran’s influence in the region, 
which threatens its stability and security; 
• Providing an alternative to preventative strike, which could turn into a 
messy, protracted engagement that possibly catalyzes further regional 
instability; 
•  Protecting deployed forces and installations within the region; 
• Providing assurances to the United States’ GCC allies of the U.S. 
commitment to their security, which will prevent them from desiring to 
obtain nuclear weapons of their own and avert horizontal proliferation 
within the region; 
• Preventing Iran from using nuclear weapons as a coercive tool during 
peacetime, which will discourage GCC members from aligning 
themselves with Iran for their own security; 
• Fostering better multilateral security cooperation among GCC members. 
The possible drawbacks to implementing a BMDS in the Persian Gulf region 
include:  
• Encouraging Iran to develop countermeasure technologies and saturation 
tactics to overwhelm missile defenses; 
• Upsetting relations with other regional allies such as Israel; 
• Lacking a robust multilateral collective security foundation will make 
implementing a TBMD in the Persian Gulf more challenging; 
• Lacking the capacity to burden share the technological development 
process, which is an integral, cost-saving characteristic to the phased 
adaptive approach;  
• Integrating Israeli and GCC members’ BMD capabilities to provide 
greater continuity between the Middle Eastern and European theaters will 
be more challenging due to the contentious relations between Israel and its 
Arab neighbors; 
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• Embarking on another major arms deal/security cooperation with the 
autocratic Gulf regimes increases the divergence of U.S. interests and 
values. All other allies that the U.S. plans to partner with in other regions 
share the same democratic values as well as interests. 
As America moves towards deemphasizing the central role of nuclear weapons in 
national security policy, the shift in missile defense objectives to the theater level 
provides an option to rectify the policy dilemma of balancing security assurances to allies 
and bilateral and multilateral arms reduction commitments. As nuclear deterrence has 
become a hindrance to the prevention of WMD proliferation, non-nuclear security 
assurances along with soft-power tools need to be pursued to ensure stability within 
regions that will remain volatile and vulnerable through this transition towards nuclear 
elimination. The Middle East is a region requiring such security assistance. The Persian 
Gulf is an especially vulnerable region due to Iran’s provocations, and the possibility that 
it is developing nuclear weapon capabilities. Additionally, the oil wealth within the 
region and its vital role in the global economy make ensuring stability within this 
geographic area of paramount importance to the international community. Theater 
ballistic missile defense is such a non-nuclear tool that can bolster security assurances 
with GCC partners, and contribute to providing a new counter-weight to Iranian 





III. EUROPEAN AND ASIAN THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE 
DEFENSE CASE STUDIES 
The United States plans to pursue phased adaptive approaches to missile defense 
in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. It is important that Washington recognize the 
differences in threat capabilities, alliance structure and maturity, and strategic balance 
concerns within each region in order to tailor missile defenses to meet each particular 
regions security needs. European and Asian collaborative missile defense efforts are well 
underway and advanced in their development and implementation. These two regions 
have varying defense needs and collective security arrangements, and the path each has 
chosen to address ballistic missile threats reflects these differences. For this reason, 
comparatively studying the development of these regions’ missile defense capabilities 
will provide lessons learned and key differences that should be considered in the 
implementation of a phased adaptive approach in the Persian Gulf region. This chapter 
will analyze the nature of the threats, alliances, strategic balances, and development of 
missile defense initiatives in the European and Asian theaters. The findings of this 
analysis will be applied in following chapters to discussions on how to approach and 
implement cooperative missile defense with the United States’ Persian Gulf partners.   
A. EUROPE 
1. The Threat61 
While Russian and Chinese ballistic missiles have the capability of targeting 
Europe, it is unlikely that either country would deliberately undertake such action. 
Additionally, with robust safeguards in place on both arsenals, the chance of an 
accidental launch has been reduced significantly. Thus, excluding the miniscule chance 
of Russian or Chinese systems being employed, the most significant ballistic missile 
                                                
61 Ballistic missiles are classified into categories based on their maximum range: short-range ballistic 
missiles (SRBMs) travel less than 1,000 km (~620 mi), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) travel 
between 1,000–3,000 km (~620–1860 mi), intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) travel between 
3,000–5,500 km (~1860–3410 mi), and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) travel more than 5,500 
km. Mark Fitzpatrick ed., Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A net assessment (London: The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010), 8.   
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threat to Europe is Iran’s present and growing medium and intermediate-range 
capabilities. The European TBMD system aims to develop a capability to counter an 
Iranian threat, not the more sophisticated Russian and Chinese ballistic missiles. The 
open source information regarding these capabilities and their development varies and 
sometimes conflicts; however, there is strong agreement that the Shahab-3 is Iran’s 
longest-range missile that is currently deployed and fully operational. The Shahab-3 is a 
single-stage, liquid-propellant missile believed to have a range of 1,000–1,500 km with a 
payload of 760–1,100 kg.62 A missile of this range can target most of the Middle East 
and portions of Turkey. The longer-range variants of the Shahab-3, and the new solid-
propellant, two stage MRBM, the Sajjil-2, are of greater concern to Europe, since with a 
reported range of 2,500 km, they could reach parts of southeastern Europe (e.g., parts of 
the Balkans, Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria).63 The current and projected Iranian 
ballistic missile threat to Europe is depicted in Figure 1.64  
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Source: Igor Ivanov, Wolfgang Ischinger, and Sam Nunn, “Missile Defense: Toward a New Paradigm,” 
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
 
Figure 1.  Iranian Ballistic Missile Threat to Europe.                                                       
 The evidence indicates that Iran has successfully flight-tested these 
missiles, but they have not become fully operational or deployed. Thus, currently Iran 
does not have the capability of targeting NATO allies (with the exception of Turkey with 
the Shahab-3). When these longer-range missiles will be able to credibly reach European 
targets is widely debated with some estimates as early as 2015 and others past 2020.65 
Iran’s intermediate-range capabilities are still believed to be in the early developmental 
                                                
65 Hildreth, “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Programs: An Overview,” 1–2; Andrew Feickert, “Iran’s Ballistic 
Missile Capabilities,” Congressional Research Service, 23 August 2004, 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/39332.pdf, 4–6; Fitzpatrick, Iran’s Ballistic Missile 
Capabilities: A net assessment, 141–43.  
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stages. While Iran showed notable advancements throughout the 2000s in its MRBM and 
IRBM capabilities with the development of multi-stage, solid-fuelled missiles and a 
growing industrial and technical infrastructure that will allow Tehran to indigenously 
develop future missile endeavors, developing or procuring guidance and navigation 
systems still presents a challenge to improving the accuracy of these weapons.66 
Furthermore, the large investment required and the technological and industrial 
challenges to be overcome in order to develop more capable missiles tends to push full 
operational capability estimates toward the later end of the spectrum (i.e., 10-plus 
years).67 
Since Iran does not pose an immediate threat to Europe, missile defenses capable 
of countering the Iranian MRBMs and IRBMs can be fielded in a methodical manner as 
the threat develops. This situation also allows for flexibility in fielding capabilities and 
coordinating and honing multilateral missile defense operations. As will be discussed 
later, these favorable conditions for development do not exist in the Asian or Persian Gulf 
regions where the threat is already capable of targeting allied territory.  
2. U.S.–European Alliance 
A post-1949 résumé of collaboration has allowed this security arrangement to 
mature and adapt its capabilities to a wide range of security challenges. Missile defense is 
one such endeavor that NATO has chosen to pursue in the last decade as nuclear 
deterrence becomes less of a prominent fixture in alliance strategy and it attempts to deal 
with threats of WMD proliferation and rogue state behavior. The multilateral framework 
that already exists within the U.S.-European alliance makes it ideal for implementing a 
theater missile defense architecture that mirrors the complexity of such an organization in 
integrating multiple components into a coherent and effective defense system. While 
NATO provides a solid foundation upon which to build a TBMD system, there have been 
setbacks in the process. Challenges remain in the pursuit of such an ambitious objective 
even for a strong, multilateral collective security institution like NATO.   
                                                
66 Fitzpatrick, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A net assessment, 63–64.  
67 Ibid., 35–36, 63–65, 132–34. 
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3. NATO TMD Initiatives  
NATO initially began working on missile defense to protect deployed forces in 
the 1990s as a result of the proliferation of WMD and rudimentary, short-range ballistic 
missiles. At the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO decided to conduct feasibility studies to 
explore the option of implementing a theater missile defense capability to protect 
populations and territories. The studies concluded in 2005 that it would be 
technologically feasible to develop an integrated TBMD architecture to counter a limited 
threat such as Iran. At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO declared TBMD to be a core 
alliance objective and agreed to integrate all partner nations’ capabilities in this mission 
area. The evolution of TBMD in Europe has seen three major missile defense initiatives: 
the European Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) site, the Medium Extended Air 
Defense System (MEADS), and the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). All 
three of these different programs have experienced various successes and failures, and 
they illustrate some of the challenges and concerns that need to be addressed when 
pursuing such a defense initiative within a multilateral framework.68  
a. Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) 
The MEADS system was originally conceived in the 1990s as a 
collaborative effort between Italy, Germany, and the United States to field a lower-tier, 
ground-based, mobile air and missile defense system that would provide ground troop 
defense from cruise and short-range ballistic missiles. It was intended to be a composite 
of pre-existing technologies between the three nations that would be upgraded and 
integrated with one another. MEADS would be similar to the U.S. Army’s PATRIOT 
system, but it would have an upgraded interceptor, 360-degree coverage, and an 
enhanced open architecture network for multiple units that would allow for a larger 
defended area. Additionally, it was to provide greater mobility and firepower with less 
manpower. Research and development costs were split among the three nations with the 
                                                
68 Steven A. Hildreth, “Ballistic Missile Defense: Historical Overview,” Congressional Research 
Service, 9 July 2007, 6; “Ballistic Missile Defense,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
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United States funding 58 percent, and Germany and Italy covering 25 percent and 17 
percent, respectively.69  
From the beginning, the project faced problems with budgetary constraints 
and the sharing of technical information. Delayed production and cost overruns, in 
addition to defense budget cuts, caused Washington to pull out of the program in 2011.70 
The United States agreed to continue funding for the design and development phase 
through 2014 in order to avoid contract termination fees and to minimize political 
backlash from Italy and Germany. MEADS was to replace the PAC-2 system, but with 
the delays in production (from 2007 to 2018), Washington had to fund modernization of 
their PATRIOT batteries along with contributing to MEADS; it could not continue to 
fund both programs given its constrained fiscal environment.71 With the United States 
contributing the majority of the funding for MEADS, Germany and Italy are currently 
looking for new partner nations to complete the project or may abandon it all together 
and purchase the upgraded PAC-3 system, which has incorporated technology from the 
MEADS program, or opt for a similar air and missile defense system to the one that the 
United Kingdom and France fielded (the SAMP-T system).72  
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b. European Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Site 
In addition to its lower-tier collaboration, the United States made plans to 
contribute to upper-tier missile defense systems in Europe with the Bush Administration 
announcing a third GMD site to be located in Europe. In 2007, the United States made 
bilateral agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic to base elements of this 
system––10 ground based interceptors (GBIs) in Poland and an X-band radar in the 
Czech Republic, which was intended to counter a possible ballistic missile threat from 
Iran. This proposal was met with criticism from other NATO allies, since they feared 
upsetting the tenuous strategic balance with Russia. Other members felt the bilateral 
nature of the agreements undermined NATO solidarity. President George W. Bush’s plan 
seemed to be ill fitted to the security needs of America’s European allies. Due to these 
concerns, this missile defense plan was not ratified prior to Bush leaving office; his 
successor would address these challenges of implementing theater missile defenses with a 
new approach that aimed to be more in tune with the NATO framework and less 
provocative towards Russia.73  
c. European Phased Adaptive Approach  
In 2009, President Barack Obama announced the cancellation of the third 
GMD site in Europe, and offered a new initiative relying heavily upon the proven sea-
based, Aegis SM-3 capability. This latest program is the European Phased Adaptive 
Approach (EPAA), which consists of a four-phase implementation process. Each phase is 
geared toward a specific predicted threat capability. While there is a tentative timeline for 
when phases will be deployed in Europe, their implementation is highly dependent upon 
the threat’s evolution.74  Currently, Phase I is operational, which means that portions of 
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southern Europe can be defended from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles 
utilizing the Aegis BMD platform with SM-3 Block IA interceptors along with the TPY-
2 radar deployed in Turkey.75 Command and control functions have been also 
demonstrated between the U.S. and European BMD systems at Ramstein Air Force Base 
in Germany with the NATO ALTBMD (Active Layer Theater Ballistic Missile Defense) 
system. Figure 2 displays the progression of increased capability in each stage; the final 
two phases will defend all of Europe from an Iranian IRBM threat, and potentially have a 
limited ICBM and early intercept capability. This initiative also includes the forward 
deployment of four U.S. Navy Aegis BMD destroyers out of Rota, Spain, and two Aegis 
Ashore sites that will be stationed in Romania and Poland.76 EPAA is the United States 
contribution to Europe’s ALTBMD program. Each NATO ally is contributing to the 
construction of an open command and control architecture, so that each nation’s sensors, 
interceptors, and command and control functions can be integrated. Other allies are 
providing their indigenously produced land, sea, and air-based sensor coverage and ship- 
and shore-based, lower-tier interceptors that will be plugged into this architecture, so that 
all of NATO’s capabilities are interoperable and contributing to situational awareness, 
planning and tasking, and execution of the TBMD mission area.77 This missile defense 
initiative is still a work in progress, and it will undoubtedly encounter challenges as it is 
implemented; however, it provides a more robust, flexible, and multilateral approach than 
has previously been attempted that meets the wide-ranging security needs of NATO 
allies.  
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Figure 2.  European Phased Adaptive Approach.  
Source: Missile Defense Agency. 
 
4. Regional Implications 
The major political challenge with implementing this TBMD architecture in 
Europe is balancing NATO’s desire to defend against an Iranian ballistic missile threat 
while not provoking Russian suspicion or mistrust. Missile defense is a sensitive topic for 
Russia, especially since the United States’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty (ABMT) in 2002. Moscow desires to be seen as an equal by NATO members, and 
wants to play a broader role in regional security and politics. Missile defense is one of 
these facets. The EPAA originally called for a cooperative role with Russia with data 
exchange centers and incorporation of early-warning components. However, these 
cooperative efforts have not materialized in the manner originally envisioned, so Russia 
is left questioning NATO’s intentions as it continues to be left out of the all-
encompassing, collaborative effort that the EPAA originally planned with Moscow. 
Achieving a balance with Russia on TBMD developments with NATO partners is the 
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greatest political challenge to implementing the EPAA, and one that will require greater 
Russian inclusion if it is to be successful.78  
B. ASIA 
1. The Threat 
 There are three major ballistic missile threats in the Asian theater that are 
of varying concern to the United States and its regional allies. As in the European theater, 
Russian capabilities are unlikely to be employed against its Asian neighbors. China’s 
growing military prowess coupled with uncertainty over its larger territorial, strategic, 
and political aims are of concern to the United States and its allies in the region. Thus, 
while U.S.-Japanese TBMD efforts are not currently aimed at countering China’s arsenal, 
as missile defense capabilities advance, and if China continues pursue a more aggressive 
foreign policy stance towards its neighbors, then there is the possibility that a TBMD 
architecture could be designed to counter the Chinese threat. However, North Korea is 
currently the most concerning, near-term ballistic missile threat to Japan and South 
Korea. 
North Korea possesses SRBM, MRBM, and IRBM capabilities. The SRBMs are 
of primary concern to South Korea, and the MRBMs and IRBMs are the greatest threat to 
Japan and to U.S. bases in the region. North Korea’s SRBMs are upgraded versions of the 
SCUD B variant; its MRBMs include the Nodong-1 and -2 and Taepodong-1, and its 
IRBM capability consist of the Taepodong-2. The Nodong-1 and 2 can target most of 
Japan, while the Taepodong-1 can target all of Japan. The Latter is the missile that 
overflew Japan in 1998 that provided the impetus for Tokyo to engage with Washington 
on building a bilateral missile defense architecture. While North Korea possesses nuclear 
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weapons, it does not yet have the capability of putting a nuclear warhead on its ballistic 
missiles; however, it is believed that Pyongyang does have operational chemical and 
biological warheads.79   The North Korean ballistic missile threat is depicted in Figure 3. 
 
  
Figure 3.  North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat.  
Source: Federation of American Scientists, Global Security, 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies 
 
China has a much greater ballistic missile capability than North Korea. The Chinese 
threat to Japan consists of two types of MRBMs and one type of IRBM (both capable of 
delivering nonconventional munitions). Ballistic missile defense efforts between America 
and Japan have thus far focused on countering the North Korean threat; however, as will 
be discussed in the “Regional Implications” section below, there is the possibility that the 
growing missile defense capability could potentially counter a limited strike from China 
at some point. For this reason, China views the U.S.-Japanese BMD build-up with 
concern. Some defense analysts have attributed Beijing’s modernization and increase in 
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ballistic missiles as a reaction, at least in part, to the missile defense activities of the 
United States and Japan.80 
2. U.S.-Asia Pacific Alliances 
The United States’ missile defense collaboration with partners in the Asia-Pacific 
region is bilateral in nature; these BMD relations include Australia, Japan, and South 
Korea (Taiwan has PAC-2 firing units, but they are not recognized as an active U.S. 
BMD partner). South Korea mainly employs lower-tier systems like the PAC-2, since 
they face a shorter-range threat. Australia is a BMD framework partner and is considering 
upgrading its Aegis ships to include BMD capabilities. Japan represents the United 
States’ strongest BMD partner, as it has implemented the most robust, layered missile 
defense system in the region. Thus, the focus here will be on the U.S.-Japan alliance and 
BMD collaboration.81 
The U.S.-Japan alliance has its roots in Japan’s defeat at the end of World War II 
and the United States’ occupation that lasted until 1952. The U.S. drafted Japan’s 
constitution and included Article 9, which took away its right as a sovereign nation to 
wage war and maintain any form of armed force; however, Japan did retain a Self-
Defense Force (SDF). In 1960, Tokyo and Washington established a formal bilateral 
alliance that guides their partnership today with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security. In return for granting the United States basing rights on its territory, Japan 
received American security guarantees. This defense arrangement was unique, because 
the defense was not mutual––Japan was not committed to come to the United States’ aid 
if it were attacked. This security bias was on account of maintaining Japan’s Article 9 
obligations, which prohibited Japan from being in any formal collective security 
organization. Through this alliance, America has been able to operate forward in East 
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Asia from its strategic position on the Japanese islands. Despite Japan’s constitutional 
interpretations that constrain it from participating in collective security and arms export 
arrangements, new interpretations of these restraints have allowed the U.S.-Japanese 
missile defense efforts to move forward, and a robust, multi-layered missile defense 
architecture has been established.82  
3. U.S.-Japan TBMD Initiatives 
Japan expressed initial interest in missile defense in the 1980s during Reagan’s 
SDI era; however, in August 1998, this cursory interest turned into a primary defense 
objective with the launching of North Korea’s Taepodong-1 ballistic missile that 
overflew Japan. As North Korea continued its quest for nuclear weapons and withdrew 
from the NPT in 2003, the Japanese cabinet officially announced that building its missile 
defenses was a top national priority. In the decade since this declaration, Japan has 
entered into a highly collaborative missile defense partnership with the U.S. This missile 
defense architecture consists of 16 PAC-3 firing units for lower-tier defense, and four 
Aegis BMD destroyers that regularly train and operate with U.S. BMD ships that provide 
upper-tier protection with their SM-3 interceptors. Japan is also working jointly with 
United States on the development of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor that will provide 
enhanced intermediate-range defense capabilities. The JSDF also has an indigenous radar 
network that is fully integrated with U.S. sensors (SPY-1 and TPY-2) and provides early 
warning and tracking capabilities. Both forces have developed a highly dynamic and 
sophisticated command and control network with established emergency response 
procedures. While the U.S.-Japan BMD effort is the most successful thus far despite the 
legal constraints on the alliance, there are concerns that continued progress on BMD and 
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other areas of collaboration may reach a point where these legal constraints become a 
hindrance.83   
4. Regional Implications 
The U.S.-Japan TBMD endeavor has caused great angst in China, which finds 
missile defense even more troublesome than Russia due to its limited nuclear deterrent. 
Some analysts have already pointed to China’s increased ICBM production and 
positioning of SRBMs opposite Taiwan’s coastline as a sign of an impending arms race 
in the region, with TBMD at least being partially blamed as a catalyst for such 
antagonistic behavior.84 As Washington and Tokyo increase their interoperability and 
expand their joint missile defense capabilities, the more friction is likely to result with 
Beijing. For example, the United States’ decision to possibly base another AN/TPY-2 
radar on one of Japan’s southern islands (the first radar is located in one of Japan’s 
northern prefectures) to enhance detection and discrimination of North Korean ballistic 
missiles would also provide coverage over China and Taiwan.85 This type of expansion 
of TBMD capabilities from the U.S.-Japan alliance, while meant to hedge against DPRK 
aggression, could provoke conflict and instability in an already fragile relationship with 
China. Furthermore, extending the TBMD architecture beyond Japan would prove 
challenging due to its checkered past with neighboring South Korea. It would also require 
a significant paradigm shift in Japan’s defense policy; to allow Japan to participate in 
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collective security arrangements, which would further provoke China and escalate 
tensions in the region. As the U.S. military pivots to the Pacific, it will have to remain 
cognizant that any action it takes concerning TBMD in this region could cause negative 
reactions that will undermine Washington’s objective of maintaining stability and order 
in the Asian-Pacific theater.86  
C. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE LESSONS LEARNED 
This analysis of the European and Japanese approaches to developing and 
implementing TBMD is a reflection of their varying defense needs and collective security 
arrangements. This final section identifies the lessons learned and key differences that 
can be drawn from the analysis of the threats, alliances, strategic balances, and missile 
defense initiatives in the European and Asian theaters that could help inform the pursuit 
of cooperative missile defense in the Persian Gulf. 
First, the nature of the threat and geography of each region has influenced the 
character of how missile defense has been executed with these U.S. partners. Both 
regions face MRBM and IRBM threats, so acquiring upper-tier systems is desired in 
order to have multiple opportunities to engage such threats. While MRBM and IRBM 
threats are the greatest concern to each theater, Europe is hedging against a potential 
future threat, while Japan is dealing with an existing one. Thus, NATO can develop a 
phased plan that flexibly responds to the growing Iranian ballistic missile capabilities, 
whereas Japan had to employ a TBMD system as quickly as possible, since it was already 
behind the threat curve. Additionally, geography plays a significant role in TBMD 
architecture. Since Japan is an island nation, the defended area is much smaller and lends 
itself to sea-based missile defense, since BMD ships can be stationed anywhere around 
Japan to achieve ideal intercept geometries based off ballistic missile trajectories. This 
geographical consideration explains Japan’s investment in acquiring its own BMD Aegis 
destroyers. Conversely, NATO is attempting to defend large portions of the European 
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continent. The defended area is much larger and lacks as many maritime options. Thus, 
sea-based assets alone cannot accomplish a robust TBMD system. Hence NATO plans to 
employ Aegis-Ashore in locations that are optimal for missile interception. Thus, 
geography and threat capabilities need to be considered in developing future TBMD 
architectures.  
Second, the alliance structure with these two regions significantly impacted the 
implementation of TBMD. Japan’s bilateral alliance appears to have allowed for a more 
streamlined process to develop and field TBMD components in an expeditious manner, 
since it is the only U.S. ally that has a fully operational, multi-layered missile defense 
system. However, up-scaling this successful model to the broader Asian region will prove 
difficult due to the legal constraints on Japan and its alliance with America. A defended 
area that encompasses large swaths of land with multiple states, as is the case in Europe 
and the Persian Gulf, necessitates the use of a multilateral approach in order to be 
successful. While NATO is a mature, multilateral alliance, its pursuit of a TBMD system 
that provides security for all member nations has not been without its own challenges. 
The GMD and MEADS are examples of the challenges of incorporating the wide range 
of multiple members’ capabilities, burden-sharing research and development efforts, and 
transferring technology and information among partner nations. Balancing the needs and 
interests of various and diverse states is a formidable task; however, if a robust and 
effective TBMD system is a desired outcome, then a multilateral framework is required.  
TBMD hinges upon balancing relations with states outside the immediate 
alliance. If misunderstandings over missile defense intentions cannot be resolved with 
regional actors, then its overall objectives of reinforcing stability will be undermined. 
Relations with China and Russia pose challenges to the development of the Asian and 
European TBMD systems. Thus, embarking on collaborative efforts (in the case of 
Russia) and using measured progress (in the case of China) should be considered in 
resolving issues of TBMD misunderstanding. Maintaining Israel’s qualitative military 
edge (QME) is the major regional balance obstacle to pursuing TBMD in the Persian 
Gulf region.  
 47 
This comparative analysis of European and Asian TBMD approaches provides 
some possible guidelines for implementing cooperative missile defense with the United 
States’ Persian Gulf partners. Analysis of the threat, alliance structure, and regional 
implications will be applied to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the following 
chapters. There are many things that set this region apart from the two discussed here; 
nonetheless, some of the challenges they face in TBMD may be similar. As the Persian 
Gulf stands to be the most challenging missile defense program to implement, noting the 
similarities and differences with the previously established programs provides a pathway 
forward for implementing a phased adaptive approach to missile defense that is tailored 
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IV. GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL THEATER BALLISTIC 
MISSILE DEFENSE CASE STUDY: THREAT ANALYSIS 
A. BACKGROUND: GCC-IRANIAN RELATIONS  
With its growing asymmetric power, provocative rhetoric, nuclear program non-
compliance, and subversive influence throughout the Middle East, Iran is one of the more 
troublesome states within the region, and its antagonistic behavior is especially 
concerning for its most proximate neighbors. For these reasons, the GCC states view Iran 
as the most significant external threat to their security and the broader stability of the 
Persian Gulf. The contentious relationship between the Arab Gulf states and Iran is often 
understood merely along its sectarian and ethnic cleavages; however, simply attributing 
the current regional turmoil to persisting ancient hatreds that formed centuries ago 
between empires and over ideological splits in the Islamic faith overlooks the actual root 
causes of what is driving hostilities in the Persian Gulf. Structural tensions and strategic 
competition between the two dominate powers in the region, Iran and Saudi Arabia, drive 
both conflict and collaboration in the geopolitical arena of the Persian Gulf.87 
Iran and Saudi Arabia aspire to be regional hegemons and vie for preeminence 
amongst the broader Middle East Islamic community. However, they have differing 
perspectives on the organization of regional order. The 2009 Rand Corporation study 
Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam cites divergent visions over regional 
hierarchy and the role of the United States in the region as key points of contention 
between these two states:  
Since 2003, the fundamental driver of the relationship is a struggle to 
shape the regional balance of power. Each state sees the expansion of 
regional influence by the other as a net loss for itself…This game of 
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geopolitics is aided by the fact that the regional landscape is defined by 
weak states and contending local factions that invite outside meddling.88  
Saudi Arabia views Iran’s use of asymmetric power and pursuit of nuclear 
weapons as evidence of the Islamic Republic’s expansionist intentions, especially in post-
Saddam Iraq. Riyadh relies on the United States as a security guarantor to assist in 
containing Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf in order to ensure regional stability, as 
well as to bolster its own regime authority and legitimacy. The Islamic Republic views 
Saudi Arabia as a proxy of the United States and a hindrance to its rightful position atop 
the regional hierarchy. Since its 1979 revolution, Tehran desires independence from 
foreign powers in its domestic politics and the broader Persian Gulf domain, and it has 
made overtures to the Arab Gulf monarchies to join it as equal partners in ensuring 
regional security free from external, in particular American, intervention. However, 
Riyadh doubts the sincerity of these claims, and believes Tehran designs to relegate Saudi 
Arabia to a subordinate role in the region.89 
Disparities in political ideologies and governance support these concerns. Iran is a 
theocracy with semi-democratic institutions, vesting overall authority in its clerical elite. 
Tehran is adamantly against the type of dynastic rule that its Arab neighbors employ––
where there is an interdependent relationship with clerical leaders, but ultimately, they 
are relegated to positions of junior status under the ruling families. Contrasting energy 
economy outlooks are a final point of contention between these regional powers that are 
both OPEC members. Saudi Arabia has the largest proven oil reserves in the world and a 
relatively small population, so it can pursue a long-term strategy of moderate oil prices. 
Conversely, Iran’s smaller oil reserves and larger population necessitates a short-term 
view that promotes higher oil prices (See Table 3 on page 77). These factors drive 
geopolitical infighting between the major powers. The smaller Gulf monarchies are 
caught in-between an overbearing Riyadh and a menacing Tehran, which has created 
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disunity in the GCC as some of these states choose more accommodating relations with 
Iran.90    
Iran has been a pariah in the Persian Gulf since its 1979 Islamic Revolution. Its 
relations with its Arab Gulf neighbors have gone from one of extreme bipolarity that 
created an ideological Cold War in the region in the 1980s, to moderation and 
cooperation as a reformist regime came to power in Iran in the 1990s, to increased 
antagonism and uncertainty with the elimination of Saddam-ruled Iraq as a critical 
counterweight for the regional balance of power in the last decade. The American-led 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 had contained Iran on both its eastern and 
western fronts. As the United States withdraws its military forces from the region and 
leaves fragile states behind, Iran appears to be seizing this opportunity to expand its 
influence throughout the region, especially in post-Saddam Iraq. For the GCC, a crucial, 
stabilizing element to the structural make-up of the region has been removed––an 
autocratic Iraq under Saddam Hussein was a bulwark against Iranian ambitions of 
exporting its revolution beyond its borders. In addition to these changes in the regional 
balance of power, the Obama Administration’s initial overtures toward rapprochement 
with Tehran and the ensuing events of the Arab Spring that saw the disposal of long-
standing, Sunni-led, American-backed regimes in Tunisia and Egypt with barely a blink 
of an eye from Washington, has left feelings of vulnerability and perceptions of a U.S. 
lack of commitment among GCC allies. Without proper U.S. engagement, the mounting 
structural tensions in the Riyadh-Tehran relationship point towards greater conflict and 
escalation of hostilities in the region that will prove detrimental to all parties’ interests in 
the Persian Gulf.91   
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B. THE IRANIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT 
 Iran’s ballistic missiles are political weapons that enhance the asymmetric 
tactics92 it employs against the Gulf monarchs. These methods aim to cause internal 
discord within the GCC states by challenging their legitimacy, thus threatening regime 
stability and making these actions just as worrisome as direct military action on their 
territories. While Iran’s ballistic missiles may not be militarily decisive against the GCC 
states, such an attack could further undermine the monarchs’ legitimacy and power in the 
eyes of their people. If Arab Gulf countries are unable to effectively defend their 
territories and populations from a ballistic missile attack or succumb to coercion on 
account of these weapons, their foremost security concern––regime survival––would be 
at stake.93 
Ballistic missiles offer an attractive form of offensive power to regimes that lack 
ample military resources, because they are relatively cheap and can assuredly penetrate 
defenses. Thus, they can be quite effective at intimidating and coercing adversaries. 
Additionally, these weapons deliver their payloads quicker to targets, are not hindered by 
weather, and are easier to maintain and support than combat aircraft. For these reason, 
ballistic missiles are a prime feature in many arsenals of third-world militaries. Iran is an 
example of such a country, and it boasts the most robust and capable ballistic missile 
arsenal in the Middle East and continues to show a desire to improve its technologies 
within this warfare domain.94  
Tehran began acquiring ballistic missiles during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s 
from China, North Korea, and Russia. The SCUD B and C missiles acquired during this 
time period have been subsequently improved both in range and accuracy and are now 
known as the Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 with ranges of 300 km and 500 km, respectively. 
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While it is difficult to determine the exact quantity of missiles due to Iran’s ability to 
produce missiles indigenously, most defense experts estimate the Shahab-1 and Sahab-2 
inventory to be between 300 and 400 missiles.95 The Shahab-1 and 2, along with 
approximately 250 Chinese CSS-8 and CSS-7 missiles (150 km and 280 km, 
respectively), constitute the majority of Iran’s current ballistic missile capability, and the 
most likely to target major population and economic centers within the Gulf region, as 
well as U.S. military installations.96 While the primary ballistic missile threat in the 
Persian Gulf is within SRBM range, Iran’s advanced MRBM capabilities can reach 
targets beyond the littoral regions and into the Gulf of Oman (e.g., population centers in 
inland Saudi Arabia and along the Red Sea and the littoral region of Oman).97  
Over the past 20 years, Iran has pushed to advance its indigenous ballistic missile 
program. The Shahab-3 is the first MRBM in Iran’s inventory with a range of 1,300 
km.98 The Shahab-3 was first successfully flight tested in 1997 and reported to have gone 
into mass production in 2001.99 In 2009, an improved version of the Shahab-3 known as 
the Ghadr-1 was successfully flight-tested.100 This test demonstrated a 1,600 km range, 
but experts believe it has the ability to go in excess of 2,000 km.101 It is believed there 
are currently 25–100 Shahab-3 and Ghadr-1 missiles in Iran’s inventory.102 During the 
same year, Iran also successfully tested the two-stage solid propellant Sejil-2 IRBM that 
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achieved ranges in excess of 2,000 km.103 The Iranian ballistic missile threat in the 
Persian Gulf is depicted in Figure 4. 
              
Figure 4.  The Iranian Ballistic Missile Threat in the Persian Gulf.  
Source: The Heritage Foundation. 
The shift from liquid to solid propellant missile production indicates a significant 
technological advancement in this weapons program. With solid-propellant fuel, the pre-
launch window is drastically shortened and therefore indications and warnings of a 
missile launch are significantly reduced. Defense and technical experts believe that if Iran 
were able to develop a nuclear capability, they would most likely attempt to place nuclear 
warheads on missiles as small as the Shahab-3.104  Along with these demonstrations of 
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IRBM capabilities, Iran launched a satellite into low earth orbit in 2009 utilizing a Safir-2 
rocket. Some experts express concern that Iran’s space launch vehicle program is the 
foundation for its pursuit of ICBM technology.105  
Ground-based, mobile platforms are the most likely means for launching ballistic 
missiles. Iran is estimated to have between 12–18 Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs) 
for the Shahab-1/2 and six for the Shahab-3/Ghadr-1.106 There are also indications that 
Iran has began building underground silos in Tabriz and Khorramabad (located in the 
northwestern part of Iran near the Iraqi and Turkish borders); however, while SRBMs and 
MRBMs could possibly fit in these silos and reach targets throughout the Persian Gulf, 
Israel, and Turkey, analyst believe they are probably intended for future IRBM and 
ICBM capabilities.107 Furthermore, mobile platforms provide an added element of 
uncertainty for adversaries attempting to launch pre-emptive strikes on launching units, 
since their locations prior to the first salvo are difficult to ascertain. U.S. forces 
experienced the difficulty of targeting highly mobile launch platforms in Iraq during 
Operation Desert Storm in 1991.108  
The operational proficiency of launching ballistic missile attacks is highly 
speculative due to scarce and incomplete intelligence from supposed training evolutions 
and over-exaggerated capability claims in Iranian state media releases. However, Tehran 
conducted combat operations with its Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 missiles on three separate 
occasions in 1994, 1999, and 2001 against the Iranian resistance group Mujahedin-e 
Khalq Organization (MKO), which was allowed safe harbor in Iraq. The three combat 
operations against MKO bases in Iraq utilizing Shahab missiles showed increasing 
capability in coordination between multiple firing units and ability to reload quickly and 
launch a second strike. The last attack in 2001 consisted of over 30 missiles that were 
launched with the synchronization of three missile battalions in three different regions 
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with long-range artillery batteries. Evidence also indicated that Shahab crews were 
composed of skilled operators and functional equipment that allowed for the reload and 
launch of a second attack within a two-hour time frame. Due to the number of Shahab 
missiles used in the attacks, it was inferred that Iran had acquired a sufficient indigenous 
manufacturing capability to replenish its inventory with these strategic assets.109    
While Iran has made significant advances in its ballistic missile development, 
manufacturing, and operational capabilities over the past 20 years, these conventionally 
armed weapons still lack the accuracy, and numbers in the absence of accuracy, to be 
effective against military and economic targets.110 The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies concluded that the extent of Iran’s ballistic missile capability against 
fixed targets included the possibility of causing damage and disruption at large military 
facilities or fuel storage depots, but they would be unable to completely shut down 
operations at such facilities.111 Thus, this arsenal’s most effective use would be as a 
political weapon to terrorize population centers throughout the Gulf region in a similar 
manner that was witnessed during the Iran-Iraq War and Operation Desert Storm.112 
Furthermore, Iran’s ballistic missiles are instruments that support its asymmetric tactics 
of delegitimizing Arab Gulf monarchs. Lastly, while Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities 
have not yet matured to the point of causing massive damage or loss of life, the United 
States and its allies should not be remiss about falling behind the curve in the missile 
defense arena in this region.   
C. GCC BMD OPTIONS TO COUNTER THE THREAT 
Tehran’s ballistic missile program currently poses the greatest threat to its Gulf 
neighbors with its substantial SRBM inventory; yet, the Persian Gulf region has minimal 
defenses against this threat. The Iranian ballistic missile program is progressing towards 
MRMB and IRBM capabilities, but these missile technologies are in the earliest stages of 
                                                
109 Ibid., 119–121.  
110 The estimated accuracies for the Shahab-1/2 include CEPs of 1,000 m/1,500 m, and for the 
Shahab-3/Ghadr-1, CEPs of approximately 2,500 m; Ibid., 14, 16, 20. 
111Ibid., 139.   
112Ibid., 16, 139.   
 57 
development and their numbers do not currently present as great of a threat to Israel or 
Europe. However, both Israel and Europe already have, or are in the process of 
developing, advanced BMD systems to counter this potential future threat. The Persian 
Gulf currently has a void in robust defensive measures to handle a ballistic missile attack 
from Iran, which will become even more threatening if Iran obtains nuclear weapon 
capabilities.  
While it will take time for Iran to have the full capability of fixing a nuclear 
warhead on a ballistic missile, it has shown the intellectual and industrial capacity, as 
well as the political will to continue the advancement of its offensive ballistic missile 
program, in addition to defying international protocols concerning its nuclear program. 
BMD technology is not something that can be developed and implemented quickly at the 
last minute to respond to an imminent threat. The United States and its regional allies 
cannot afford to be behind the curve in the arena of BMD; it is a warfare area that 
requires the utmost proactive agenda rather than a reactive one. It takes years, sometimes 
decades, to field a fully tested and operational system that has the ability to counter a 
ballistic missile attack within minutes.113 The Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) tenets 
of BMD emphasize the importance of reliable indications and warnings concerning an 
adversaries capabilities, intentions, and readiness, which allows the technological 
community to create defenses and gives senior leaders flexibility in decision-making and 
posturing of assets to counter a ballistic missile threat. The BMD tenets also stress that 
“BMD planning is 90-percent of the fight.”114 In the case of Iran, indications and 
warnings point towards the need for a more comprehensive BMD system to be 
incorporated into the larger deterrence architecture within the Persian Gulf region to 
protect American and its regional allies’ interests. 
The shorter range and highly mobile ballistic missile threat to the GCC states will 
be more challenging to counter than compared to the dynamics in the Asian and 
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European theaters. The shorter range means that there will be six minutes or less to react 
to an attack, which necessitates a robust and thoroughly integrated command, control, 
and communications structure, as well as cooperative sharing of intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Established pre-planned response procedures 
need to be firmly in place and understood by highly trained operators; the consummation 
of a successful engagement against a threat of this nature begins well in advance of it 
being launched.  
The TBMD architecture for the Persian Gulf should include upper- and lower-tier 
options to the greatest extent possible; PAC-3, THAAD, and Aegis SM-3 should be 
employed to create a layered defense. Due to the shorter-range of the threat, it will not 
have as long of a midcourse-phase, so there will be only a small window to engage it 
outside the atmosphere during this stage. If these SRBMs do not attain a minimum 
altitude of 70 km, Aegis SM-3 will not be able to engage them; terminal-phase defenses 
will provide the bulk of protection in this scenario. Additionally, as Dean Wilkening 
points out in his paper “A Simple Model for Calculating Ballistic Missile Defense 
Effectiveness,” the compressed maritime space to maneuver within the Persian Gulf also 
makes engaging a threat with a BMD ship difficult. The Asian theater presents a more 
favorable geometry for maritime BMD platforms. The sea-based terminal capability on 
BMD ships may be the best option for maritime intercepts against an SRBM. Wilkening 
also suggests that ten THAAD batteries would be required to provide full coverage of the 
region. Furthermore, unlike the European theater, shore-based Aegis would more than 
likely be futile in the Persian Gulf. Since Aegis-Ashore is ideal for a theater that lacks 
maritime maneuverability to provide full coverage through sea-based assets, but has 
sufficient land area between the threat and the intended target, the Persian Gulf does not 
offer this type of geometry that would be conducive to shore-based Aegis.115  
Ascent-phase capabilities currently under development and future boost-phase 
technologies would be especially helpful given the challenging space and time 
dimensions for Persian Gulf BMD. Newer variants of the SM-3 should have ascent-phase 
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capabilities. Additionally, launch-on-remote and engage-on-remote options will enhance 
interception probabilities in this difficult environment. Wilkening suggests that airborne 
boost-phase intercept (ABI) combined with space sensors could provide early detection 
and thus longer engagement windows against ballistic missile threats in the Persian Gulf 
region.116  
The Persian Gulf faces different threats and technical challenges than the 
European and Asian theaters; therefore, a slightly different approach to building a TBMD 
architecture is required for this region. While the same components can be used, their 
arrangement and integration may be different than the European and Asian systems. 
Additionally, the technical difficulties of this region are mirrored within its political 
realm and present a more challenging alliance structure to operate within to implement an 
effective TBMD architecture for the Persian Gulf.    
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V. GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL THEATER BALLISTIC 
MISSILE DEFENSE CASE STUDY: U.S.-GCC ALLIANCE & 
INTRA-GCC RELATIONS 
The alliance structure and political landscape of the Persian Gulf compounds the 
technical challenges of building a TBMD architecture in this region. The Arab Gulf 
monarchs formed the multilateral organization known as the Gulf Cooperation Council in 
1981 in an effort to integrate economic and political institutions as well as build a 
collective defense arrangement (Figure 5 is a geographical depiction of this organization). 
In its 32-year existence, the GCC’s performance has been largely characterized as a 
lackluster effort that has made minimal progress towards achieving true unity across 
political, economic, and security realms. Despite similarities in governance, economy, 
religion, ethnicity, and historical affiliation, the Sunni-led Arab Gulf monarchies harbor a 
legacy of distrust and internal tensions between one another. Recently, certain members 
have made concerted efforts toward operating in coalition environments and assuming 
larger roles in mediating political and social issues throughout the greater Middle East; 
however, all GCC members still heavily rely on bilateral security guarantees from the 
United States. Thus, the Persian Gulf alliance structure is somewhat of a hybrid between 
the multilateral NATO and the bilateral U.S.-Japan security arrangements. The dynamics 
of internal GCC relations and their individual bilateral connections to the United States 
need to be understood and taken into account in the implementation of a TBMD system 
whose success is highly dependent upon an integrated command, control, and 
communications network of sensors and interceptors that reside in different states.117  
This chapter analyzes the implications of the intricacies of the GCC alliance and 
its ties to America in acquiring joint missile defenses and how such an endeavor can be 
used to further the aims of greater integration and interoperability among the Arab Gulf 
monarchies. The chapter first addresses the history of the Persian Gulf region with 
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foreign security guarantors and how such arrangements set the foundations of security 
dependency that persists today. Then the conditions that precipitated the formation of the 
GCC and increased U.S. involvement in the region are discussed. The second portion of 
the chapter reviews the major collective defense initiatives the GCC has been involved in 
since its inception. The success or failure of these previous collaborative defense 
initiatives is analyzed within the context of the evolution in alliance dynamics given 
certain shifts in the strategic environment. The individual GCC states’ roles, interests, 
and relations to one another within the alliance are elaborated upon in the third section. 
The final portion looks at the current GCC response and actions taken thus far to deal 
with the Iranian ballistic missile threat. The findings from this chapter will be 
incorporated into the concluding chapter’s policy recommendations for the 
implementation of a Persian Gulf TBMD system. 
 
 
The Gulf Cooperation Council. Source: The Perry-Castaeda Library Map Collection, The 
University of Texas at Austin, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/. 
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A. BACKGROUND: GCC ALLIANCE AND FOREIGN SECURITY 
GUARANTORS   
While there are similarities between the European and Asian alliance structures 
and the GCC’s multilateral and bilateral security aspects, there are two main differences: 
(1) The GCC is a fairly new alliance; it has not had the nearly 200 years of learning that 
the European allies have had to develop a mature multilateral collective security 
organization,118 and (2) the bilateral security guarantees from foreign powers is more 
deeply rooted in the psyche of the region than in Japan, since such entities have been 
prevalent in the region for centuries, providing protection to the littoral sheikdoms from 
external forces.119 These foreign defense providers played a significant role in forming 
the modern state structures within the region. These differences reveal important features 
of the Arab Gulf partnership that should be considered when attempting to advance its 
interoperability and multilateral efforts. The challenges of implementing an effective 
TBMD system in the region have their roots in the historical role of foreign security 
providers and the context within which the GCC was founded.  
 Contact between the Persian Gulf and West came as a result of the 
European Age of Exploration to find maritime sea lines of communication to the Far East 
that took place between fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. The Portuguese were the first 
Western power to exercise control over the region for the benefit of trade. The British 
began to make inroads in the Persian Gulf in the middle to late eighteenth century and 
eventually usurped Portuguese control by the nineteenth century. British involvement in 
the Persian Gulf was tied to its commercial interests in its colonial crown jewel of India, 
and the defense of the sea lines of communication leading to and from this lucrative 
colony. Piracy originating from the littorals of the Persian Gulf began causing disruptions 
to shipping from India and the local pearling industry. Additionally, due to the weak state 
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of affairs between tribal entities of the Arabian Peninsula, the British were concerned 
about other imperial powers gaining control of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, thus 
threatening its monopoly over commerce traveling from India. Given the strategic 
importance of this region to the economic vitality of Great Britain, a British residency 
was established in the Persian Gulf in the late eighteenth century to maintain an 
acceptable level of stability and order in the region through controlling to various degrees 
the political and economic affairs of the littoral states (Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, 
Oman, and portions of the Iranian coast). They exercised this control through establishing 
relationships with local merchants that had ties to the different tribal sheiks. Throughout 
the nineteenth century, the British made various arrangements with the local rulers that 
allowed them to manage international affairs, external threats, and mediation of tribal 
disputes that threatened maritime commerce in exchange for not meddling within internal 
tribal matters. Eventually, these agreements grew to include treaties that prohibited the 
rulers from relinquishing any of their territory to another imperial power without British 
consent.120  
This political infrastructure that the British set up in early 1800s to stabilize the 
region had long-lasting structural effects on governance and security institutions of the 
modern Arab Gulf states. In establishing stability within the Persian Gulf, the British 
relied upon propping up local tribal families and ensuring their reign in order to maintain 
the delicate regional balance of power. After a century and half of increasing power and 
wealth, especially with the discovery of oil in the region in the twentieth century, these 
tribal leaders were poised to take control of these countries after the British withdrawal 
and their ensuing independence in the 1960s and 1970s. These tribal sheiks were able to 
consolidate power under their rule and became the current monarchs of the Persian Gulf 
states; however, their legitimacy and security continue to be dependent upon foreign 
power assistance, namely the United States.121 
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The official withdraw of the British from the Persian Gulf in 1971 resulted in a 
power vacuum that led to a tumultuous two-decade long period in the region. In the 
absence of super power mediation that had managed conflict and tensions in the region 
for a century and a half, internal and external hostilities flared. Iran, Iraq, and Saudi 
Arabia vied for regional supremacy, while the smaller Arab emirates struggled to respond 
to this chaotic new regional order by consolidating their power, strengthening their 
legitimacy, and balancing their need for protective cover from their larger Arab 
neighbor–––Saudi Arabia–––while still maintaining their sovereignty.  With its Cold War 
commitments in Europe and Vietnam, the United States did not have the military 
wherewithal or political will to take up the reigns as chief arbiter and security guarantor 
in the Persian Gulf in the 1970s. Instead, Washington adopted a “Twin Pillars” policy of 
supporting the two dominant powers in the region that it had cultivated relations with 
over the previous decades––Iran and Saudi Arabia–––to police the region and maintain 
an acceptable level of order.122 It would take 20 years of experiencing the negative 
repercussions of instability in this part of the world for Washington to fully commit itself 
to the security of this region.123  
The absence of a foreign power broker in this part of the world led to the creation 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council as an effort of the Arab Gulf monarchs to create some 
semblance of stability in their neighborhood as successive crises plagued the region in the 
decade following the departure of Great Britain. The Gulf monarchies’ common 
historical experiences and similar political, economic, and social systems provided an 
attractive possibility of an indigenous cooperative arrangement to replace Western 
intercession; however, reveling in their new found independence, desiring to establish 
their own identity, and unwilling to relinquish their sovereignty to any supranational 
entity after shedding the last vestiges of colonialism, would see such an arrangement 
unmet in the first decade without superpower intervention. It would take the successive 
crises in the late 1970s and early 1980s of the fall of the Shah in Iran (1979), the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan (1979), and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War (1980) to provide a 
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watershed in the emirates’ attitudes towards systems of cooperation. These events 
impressed upon the Gulf monarchs their inability to independently respond to such crises 
with their comparatively underdeveloped militaries, and that an organization founded on 
the integration of their common political, economic, and social systems could also 
provide collective security for all participants in such a union. Thus, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council was formally established in 1981 with primary objectives aimed at 
political and economic integration; however, given the circumstances that it was created 
under and the ensuing events of the next decade, the GCC would increasingly become 
involved in pursuing collective security initiatives.124 
While the United States was reluctant to assume complete responsibility for the 
protection and stability of the Persian Gulf region from the British in the 1970s, as the 
crises continued unabated throughout this period of foreign disengagement, Washington 
was forced to gradually assume a more prominent role in the regional security structure. 
Starting with the 1973 oil embargo, the effects of Middle East instability on the American 
way of life became apparent. This event was followed by the overthrow of the close U.S. 
ally Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi during the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. These events saw increases in U.S. naval patrols in the Persian 
Gulf and Indian Ocean as well as developing closer ties to the smaller Arab emirates 
along with Saudi Arabia as a result of the collapse in the “Twin Pillars” strategy. With 
the centerpiece of the American strategy that made the Nixon Doctrine possible in the 
Persian Gulf no longer in existence, the Carter Doctrine proclaimed that the U.S. would 
defend its interest in the region by force if necessary, especially against any Soviet 
advances in the region. In addition this new policy, the Carter administration created a 
rapid response force known as the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), secured 
foreign base rights for pre-positioning of forces in Oman, Somalia, and Kenya, and 
improved its air and sea lift capabilities in the region. Within a year of the RDJTF’s 
creation and the Carter Doctrine’s annunciation, another calamity engulfed the region, the 
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Iran-Iraq War. Upon request from the nascent GCC, the United States Navy began 
escorting oil tankers through the region’s troubled waters to protect them from Iranian 
attack as a result of hostilities between these regional actors and the GCC’s subsequent 
support for Iraq in the conflict as a means to contain Iran. The United States also tacitly 
supported Saddam’s regime with intelligence and reconnaissance information and turned 
a blind eye towards the GCC’s funneling of weapons and money to Iraq. Following the 
end of the Iran-Iraq War, most the U.S. air and naval assets redeployed, but only two 
years later would they return in full force when Saddam invaded Kuwait, and the GCC 
called upon American assistance once again. This fourth and final occurrence during this 
interregnum would see Washington establish a permanent presence in the region through 
bilateral alliances with the Arab monarchs and assume the full duties and responsibilities 
as the region’s chief security guarantor.125  Twenty years of successive crises in the 
Persian Gulf had taken a toll on American interests, especially in the way of economic 
losses, to the point that the United States could no longer endure the unhinged nature of 
the region and its negative effects on U.S. national security. The U.S. military presence 
had steadily risen during this time period, but a permanent security infrastructure had not 
been established. Following the liberation of Kuwait, much like the previous Western 
super powers before it, America came to realize the necessity of ensuring the stability of 
this troubled corner of the world.126  
B. GCC COLLECTIVE SECURITY INITIATIVES 
The turmoil of the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War were catalysts for 
cooperation amongst the Arab monarchs that led to the formation of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council. While collective security was not explicitly mentioned in the signed charter of 
1981, within the first 18 months of its establishment, the GCC had put in place a 
framework for implementing a cooperative military program and allocated a combined 
$30.6 billion towards cooperative defense efforts. By 1984, a combined force known as 
the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF) was created. The PSF was initially composed of 10,000 
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troops divided into infantry, armor, artillery, and combat support elements. Bilateral and 
multilateral ground, air, and maritime exercises were conducted between GCC members 
throughout the duration of the war.127 
Despite this fledging defense organization’s impressive build-up and pooling of 
military resources and willingness to increase military interoperability, it was unable to 
effectively respond to the turmoil of the Iran-Iraq War and relied on U.S. intervention and 
the international community to restore stability and order to the region. The GCC was a 
new organization at the time of the Iran-Iraq War, so it ability to handle such a conflict on 
its own was not surprising; however, its failure to respond to an invasion of one of its 
members in 1990 was far more humiliating to the alliance. This lack of success resulted 
in members abandoning the organization’s multilateral security aims in favor of bilateral 
agreements with the United States, which became a permanent fixture in the regional 
security infrastructure following the First Gulf War. The GCC’s early failures at 
executing multilateral security operations during the Iran-Iraq and First Gulf Wars 
created pessimism towards the continuance of building a robust combined military 
program. Thus, in the aftermath of these debacles, the Gulf monarchies have allowed 
their distrust of one another, fear of Saudi hegemony, and concerns of strong national 
militaries threatening regime supremacy to undermine progress towards a multilateral 
regional defense arrangement. The analysis of four collective security initiatives––the 
Iran-Iraq War, the First Gulf War, the Gulf Security Dialogue and the U.S.-GCC 
Strategic Cooperation Forum, and the PSF’s intervention in Bahrain––that span the 
existence of the GCC and their subsequent outcomes will provide insight into the 
development of an effective TBMD system with member states and ways to mitigate 
prospective challenges to such an endeavor.  
1. The Iran-Iraq War  
The eight-year long Iran-Iraq War precipitated from the Iranian Revolution and 
resulted in one of the most devastating conventional wars in the twentieth century with 
400,000 lives lost. It is remembered as a war that came with great cost, but little benefit 
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for either side or the region as a whole. As an article in The Economist put it, “This was a 
war that should never have been fought…neither side gained a thing, except the saving of 
its own regime. And neither regime was worth the sacrifice.”128 The war saw the use of 
chemical weapons against military personnel and civilians and the launching of ballistic 
missiles against population centers for the first time since the German V-2 assaults of 
World War II. These characteristics of the conflict had lasting psychological effects on 
the regional leaders and have had a significant impact on their geopolitical calculus in the 
two and half decades since the signing of the cease fire agreement.129  
The bourgeoning GCC played an indirect role through its financial support and 
funneling of weapons through their territories to Iraq. While Iraq had been a long time 
adversary of the Arab monarchs, all Sunni-ruled parties set aside differences and agreed 
that the Iranian design to export its revolution to its Arab neighbors was a credible threat 
to their regime survival. Thus, Iraq was a convenient counterweight for the GCC, since it 
would bear the brunt of the pain of war and keep Iran preoccupied and prevent it from 
menacing its neighbors on the other side of the Gulf. The subsidies that the GCC 
provided to Iraq were insufficient to bring about a decisive victory in their favor as the 
war eventually ended in a stalemate, so their financial support only contributed to the 
further prolongation and destabilization of the region. A facet of the war that directly 
affected the Arab emirates was the disruption to oil commerce due to Iranian attacks on 
oil tankers, which took a particular toll on Kuwait’s oil revenues. The GCC was not ready 
to respond to such a threat, so the United States was called upon to intervene, which lead 
to U.S. naval escort operations of tankers through the troubled shipping lanes of the 
Persian Gulf and the destruction of Iranian oil platforms suspected of intelligence 
collection. In addition to the U.S. intervention in the maritime domain, the war was 
eventually brought to an end by international pressure exercised through the United 
Nations Security Council.130 
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The GCC attempted to operate as a unified political entity in order to defend the 
interests of all its members in the wake of the Iranian Revolution and the subsequent 
Iran-Iraq War. However, ultimately it failed and resulted in the need for foreign 
intervention to settle the conflict. Furthermore, its indirect involvement in the conflict 
would prove to worsen its position in the region as the war consolidated the Islamic 
Republic’s power instead of weakening it, and the aftermath of a debt-strapped Iraq 
would become a direct threat to GCC members within two years of the close of Iran-Iraq 
hostilities.131 While disappointing, this lackluster performance is to be expected of a new 
collective security organization consisting of states that had recently gained their 
independence and were still consolidating government power individually. However, the 
GCC’s inability to prevent or effectively respond to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 
would be far more humiliating to the integrity of the institution that eventually derailed 
its progress towards greater multilateral cooperation.  
2. The First Gulf War and Its Aftermath  
The GCC members made overtures towards improving the organization’s 
collective security apparatus both through agreed crisis responses and integration of 
military resources, but these plans had failed to materialize by August 1990.  Thus, the 
collective security mechanisms of the organization were completely ill-equipped and 
unprepared to respond to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Iran-Iraq War had left Iraq 
completely bankrupt and in a dire economic situation. Saddam saw the occupation of 
Kuwait as a solution to Iraq’s financial woes as it would allow Iraq greater access to the 
Rumaila oil field and a longer coastline along the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, there had 
been a historical border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait that had never been fully settled 
since Kuwait’s independence in 1961. The GCC members overlooked Iraq’s financial 
situation and did not view Saddam’s grievances as a grave threat to Kuwait’s security. 
Even after Saddam threatened military action in July, which prompted Kuwait to call for 
an emergency meeting of the GCC, there was no collective effort on the organization’s 
part to mediate the dispute. The only efforts to calm tensions came from individual 
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countries (Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia), and only one of them was a GCC 
member.132  
Some of the members felt that Saddam was bluffing and that a strong collective 
reaction may only provoke him; even Kuwait believed that if Saddam were to pursue 
military action, he would only move as far as capturing the Rumaila oil field, the ruling 
family did not believe Saddam would attempt to annex the entire country. Thus, the 
invasion on 2 August 1990 was surprising to all parties of the GCC. Only after the 
invasion was an emergency meeting of the council convened, which condemned the 
invasion; however, member states were not prepared to respond with force. Saudi Arabia 
feared the further advance of the Iraqi Army across its borders and towards its oil fields, 
so King Fahad made the unilateral decision to call upon U.S. assistance once its own 
sovereignty was threatened. During the coalition efforts to liberate Kuwait, Bahrain, the 
UAE, Qatar, and Oman did not contribute forces and instead offered only logistical and 
technical support. 133   
This failure to fulfill collective security action in defense of one of its members 
was demoralizing for the GCC, and while the organization remained intact following the 
First Gulf War, its members chose to enter into bilateral agreements with the United 
States, which established a permanent presence in the region following this conflict. 
While the wars of the 1970s and 1980s and the absence of a foreign security guarantor 
created an impetus for the formation of a collective security organization, these threats 
also presented an impediment to the development of a robust multilateral arrangement 
among the Gulf monarchies. Overcoming deeply seeded distrusts for one another rooted 
in territorial disputes and a fear of Saudi hegemony proved to be more difficult than 
originally believed and stagnated the rapid developments in cooperation and 
interoperability required to effectively counter the arising threats in the region. 
Additionally, the GCC states had an aversion to developing strong standing armies after 
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seeing neighboring monarchies deposed by such forces throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
Thus. The PSF had become more symbolic than an effective combined military 
organization. This was evident when the Oman proposal to increase the PSF size to 
100,000 troops failed to research the agreement of all members. The fact that Saddam 
was left in power following the First Gulf War and still posed a threat to the GCC states, 
and the apparent intransience of the council’s views towards forming true institutions of 
collective security resulted in each individual state reverting to more reliable 
arrangements with the Americans. This move toward bilateral agreements with United 
States has made pursuing authentic collective security objectives in the region more 
challenging since the First Gulf War.134  
Instead of addressing the failures of the alliance following the First Gulf War, 
multilateral efforts were abandoned in favor of forming a hub-and-spoke alliance 
structure with the United States in the center. This arrangement was able to maintain a 
tenuous stability for a decade in the region; it was able to reassure the GCC states of 
America’s security commitments while at the same time containing Iraq and allowing it 
to act as a counterweight to Iran’s ambitions. This long-standing status quo of regional 
stability came to an end with the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and toppling of the Saddam 
regime. With the counterweight removed, Iran has strengthened its influence in the 
region, allied itself with the new Shi’a dominated Iraqi government, and is more 
aggressively flexing its hegemonic ambitions. As the Second Gulf War has drawn to an 
end and U.S. troops have left Iraq, the United States and the GCC recognize the 
inadequacy of the hub-and-spoke alliance structure and the need to devise a new 
mechanism to adjust to the changed structural balance in the region.135  
3. The Move towards Multilateralism: The Gulf Security Dialogue 
(GSD), the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, and the PSF 
Intervention in Bahrain 
The contours of the post-war regional structure were apparent to all parties prior 
to the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. Thus, beginning in 2006, the Bush 
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administration initiated the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD), which was to serve as a 
mechanism to promote greater intra-GCC cooperation while still fostering strong U.S.-
GCC relations.136 The GSD attempted to construct a rim around the hub-and-spoke 
model of bilateral agreements, realizing that a U.S. presence needed to be maintained in 
any future stable arrangement, but that greater integration between GCC states and a 
return to collective defense objectives is required to provide a balance in the new regional 
order of uninhibited Iranian influence and aggression.   
The Obama Administration built upon the foundation of the GSD, and in March 
2012 launched the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum (SCF) to work more 
aggressively towards establishing a formalized multilateral framework for cooperation. 
The SCF holds semi-annual meetings at locations in the United States and GCC member 
states to discuss regional defense and cooperative initiatives. Through these discussions, 
agreements have been reached to work towards multilateral cooperation in areas of 
counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, counter-piracy, border security, mine 
countermeasures, and ballistic missile defense. Full GCC participation in the mine 
countermeasure exercises and the evolution of the joint and combined Operation Eagle 
Resolve from a seminar to an integrated naval, land, and air exercise where participants 
are noticing a greater willingness to share information between one another are 
indications that the GCC is committed to making progress towards establishing a more 
multilateral collective security organization.137 
Lastly, the 2011 Arab Uprisings across the Middle East that have seen entrenched 
authoritarian regimes overthrown, some of which were long-time U.S. allies, have served 
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as an additional catalyst for driving the GCC members towards greater cooperation. The 
most recent multilateral operation undertaken by the GCC was the Bahrain intervention 
in March 2011. The GCC agreed to send 2,000 PSF troops to Bahrain to calm the internal 
unrest from the month-long protests and rioting of the predominantly Shi’a population, 
which Bahrain claimed was backed by Iran.138 This action was solely a GCC endeavor 
with the United States attempting to dissuade the GCC from embarking on such an 
intervention. While the outcome of this invention led to a violent crack down on 
protesters and a diplomatically challenging situation for the U.S., it showed the 
willingness of the GCC to act multilaterally when one of their members was threatened. 
This event also illustrated the need for continued American involvement with the GCC to 
ensure that as it begins to take on more multilateral roles and responsibilities, it exercises 
actions through internationally agreed upon norms and standards.  
C. THE INTRA-GCC POLITICAL-MILITARY BALANCE  
While the GCC states share political, economic, and religious similarities that 
bind them together in an alliance, there exist jealousies and rivalries rooted in tribal 
ancestries and territorial disputes. These differences are residual consequences from 
meddlesome colonial practices in redefining local social structures and haphazard 
boundary delineations that are exacerbated by the presence of oil and natural gas 
reservoirs. Additionally, some of the smaller emirates associate greater multilateralism 
within the GCC with increased Saudi dominance within their internal affairs, which they 
are adamantly against and wish to maintain their unique character, as well as their own 
individual domestic and foreign policies.139   
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Within the GCC, there is a split between members who welcome closer ties with 
Saudi Arabia and favor containment of Iran, and those that are more apprehensive 
towards forming closer relations with Riyadh and prefer accommodation and more 
harmonious relations with Tehran. Kuwait and Bahrain have closer ties with Saudi 
Arabia and share similar views on how to deal with Iran. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia’s 
bond was forged during the Iran-Iraq and the First Gulf Wars, since both suffered 
economic losses during the former conflict and faced threats to their territorial 
sovereignty from Iraq in the latter one. Due to its geographic proximity to Iran and Iraq 
and its smaller territorial and military size, Kuwait seeks protection from Saudi Arabia. 
Bahrain is in a precarious position, with a Shi’a majority ruled by a Sunni monarch. For 
historical and sectarian reasons, Bahrain tends to be an epicenter of tension between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. Since Bahrain relies on Saudi Arabia for protection and oil 
subsidies from an offshore oil field, the Al-Khalifa ruling family’s domestic and foreign 
policies are heavily influenced by Riyadh, which tends to prevent any move to politically 
liberalize on Manama’s part in an effort to diffuse internal unrest within its population. 
Oman, Qatar, and the UAE from a subgroup within the GCC. They tend to distance 
themselves from Saudi Arabia, favoring accommodation and rapprochement with Iran 
due to economic ties with Tehran, a desire to balance Saudi influence, and/or fear of 
Iranian retribution in the event of a conflict. This disunity and diversity within the GCC 
members plays an integral role in the challenge of forming a more robust multilateral 
organization, and hence needs to be considered in the formation of an effective TBMD 
system in this region.140    
All of the ruling families of the Arab Gulf monarchies maintain close ties with 
America and support the robust U.S. military infrastructure in the region through varying 
manners and to different degrees. They also have different military capabilities, all of 
which have been procured from overseas suppliers. The Persian Gulf region receives the 
largest amount of arms transfers than any other region. From 2008-11, the GCC states 
purchased $75.6 billion worth of arms from foreign suppliers; the majority of these 
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agreements were with the United States, which made up 85 percent of these arms 
sales.141 Tables 3 and 4 provide a summary and comparison of geographic, economic, 
energy, and military statistics among the GCC states and Iran. Figure 6 depicts the U.S. 
military footprint in the Persian Gulf, which is a byproduct of the bilateral security 
agreements with individual GCC members.  
Table 3.   GCC & Iran Population, Economy, and Energy Statistics  
 Area          
(sq km) 
Population   +GDP           
per capita 
Oil Reserves/ 
Production   
Natural Gas 
Reserves/Production 
Saudi Arabia 2,149,690 26,939,583 $25,700 264.6 billion bbl/    
10 million bbl/day 
8 trillion cu m/ 
99.23 billion cu m 
UAE 83,600 5,473,972 49,000  97.8 billion bbl/ 
3.087 billion bbl/day 
6.089 trillion cu m/ 
51.28 billion cu m 
Oman 309,500 3,154,134 28,500 4.902 billion bbl/ 
915,600 bbl/day 
849.5 billion cu m/ 
35.94 billion cu m 
Kuwait 17,818 2,695,316 43,800 101.5 billio bbl/ 
2.682 million bbl/day 
1.798 trillion cu m/ 
11.73 billion cu m 
Qatar 11,586 2,042,444 102,800 25.57 billion/bbl/  
1.631 million bbl/day 
25.2 trillion cu  m/ 
116.7 billion cu m 
Bahrain 760 1,281,332 28,200 107.2 million bbl/  
44,800 bbl/day 
92.03 billion cu m/ 
12.58 billion cu m 
Iran 1,648,195 79,853,900 $13,100 151.2 billion bbl/ 
4.231 million bbl/day 
33.07 trillion cu m/ 
146.1 billion cu m 
+ Figures in 2012 dollars 
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Table 4.   GCC & Iran Military Statistics  








(in millions of 
current U.S. $)* 
U.S. Military 
Installations 
Saudi Arabia 333,500+ 1945 small 
contingent 
45,600 - 
UAE 51,000 1994 3,000 14,300 -Al Dhafra AB 
-Jebel Ali port 
facilities 
Oman 43,000 1979 small 
contingent 
1,500 -Contingency Bases: 
Masirah, Muscat, 
Thumrait 
Kuwait 15,500 1991 15,000 2,500 -Camp Arifjan 
-Camp Buehring 
-Ali Al Salem AB 
Qatar 11,800 1992 7,500 200 -CENTCOM CAOC  
-Al Udeid AB 
Bahrain 8,200 1991 (1971) 6,000 400 -C5F HQ 
Iran 500,000 Ended 1979 - - - 
+Includes ~100,000 Saudi National Guard troops, *Arms Transfer Agreements with the U.S. from 2008-11, 
CRS Report, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R42678.pdf.  
Source: SCFR, “The Gulf Security Architecture: Partnership with the Gulf Cooperation Council”; Anthony 




Figure 5.  U.S. Military Installations in the Persian Gulf. Source: GlobalSecurity.org, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/centcom-map1.htm. 
 
D. CURRENT GCC TBMD CAPABILITIES AND INITIATIVES  
The GCC states have been as eager to purchase TBMD system components as 
they are with other military armaments; however, the challenge of building a missile 
defense infrastructure in the Persian Gulf is getting these countries to integrate their 
respective systems in order to share information and data. Additionally, training and 
operating in a joint and combined environment is required in order to have an effective 
regional missile defense capability. Each of the states has purchased through bilateral 
agreements with the United States early-warning as well as some active defense systems 
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(Kuwait and Saudi Arabia purchased PAC-2 batteries shortly after the First Gulf War).142 
The U.S. initially worked on developing each individual country’s air and missile 
defenses under the Bilateral Air Defense Initiative, given the polarized environment 
between the different Arab monarchs during the 1990s. It was hoped that these bilateral 
systems would be integrated once diplomatic relations between the GCC members 
warmed. Table 5 depicts current and pending GCC missile defense acquisitions.143  
Table 5.   GCC Current and Future TBMD Capabilities  
 TBMD Capability (2008) Current/Pending Capabilities 
Saudi Arabia I-HAWK, PAC-2 PAC-3 upgrade, considering 
purchase of 2 Aegis BMD 
destroyers and THAAD 
UAE I-HAWK THAAD, PAC-3, IAMD Center 
Oman None PAC-3 (pending) 
Kuwait I-HAWK Phase III, PAC-2 PAC-3 upgrade (pending) 
Qatar None Possible host of AN/TPY-2, PAC-
3 purchse (pending), interested in 
THAAD 
Bahrain I-HAWK Hosts U.S. PAC-2/3 batteries, 
TSP-59 BMD Radar 
Source: Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate Majority Staff Report, “The Gulf Security 
Architecture: Partnership with the Gulf Cooperation Council”; “GCC-Iran: Operational Analysis of Air, 
SAM and TBM forces,” CSIS, http://csis.org/publication/gcc-iran.   
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The initial effort to get these early-warning and communications systems 
integrated was in 1997 with the Hizam al-Taawun (HAT) or Belt of Cooperation 
Initiative. HAT was designed to share aircraft information, but it could easily be 
upgraded to track and share missile defense data. The only portion of this project that has 
been implemented is the communications component, so operators in the different 
countries have secure communications with one another; however, an agreement to share 
data from each country’s respective sensors has not been reached. The Arab Gulf 
monarchs have still not reached a level of trust with one another to move forward with 
this initiative. Command, control, communications, and the sharing of information form 
the crux of the problem in moving forward with establishing a TBMD system in the 
Persian Gulf. The GCC members have the money to purchase these systems from the 
United States; now they need the political will to integrate their capabilities with one 
another, so that a functioning TBMD architecture can be fully realized.144  
While the Gulf monarchs have made individual overtures at conferences and 
forums to work toward greater integration within the missile defense domain progress 
has been slow. However, the UAE’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) training 
center is proving to be a possible coalition building mechanism within the GCC. This 
center is a state-of-the-art facility for IAMD training that the Emirates built in 
conjunction with the United States to service their military needs; however, it has 
welcomed other European and GCC countries for training. Due to the efforts of this 
training center, all GCC members participated in a recent IAMD exercise for the first 
time. Additionally, some members have shown a willingness to engage in multilateral 
tabletop and war-gaming exercises overseas.145    
                                                
144 IHS Jane’s Defense & Security Intelligence and Analysis, “Hizam Al Taawun,”18 September 
2012, accessed through NPS library proxy, Jane’s C4I Systems; Kevin M. Mullen, “Regionally Integrated 
Air and Missile Defense: The Future of Defense and Deterrence in the Middle East,” Air Command and 
Staff College, April 2010, 
http://dtlweb.au.af.mil///exlibris/dtl/d3_1/apache_media/L2V4bGlicmlzL2R0bC9kM18xL2FwYWNoZV9t
ZWRpYS80MjIyOA==.pdf, 14–17; Mahmoud Habboush, “U.S. wants GCC to share defence data,” The 
National, 12 January, 2010, http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/us-wants-gcc-to-share-
defence-data.  
145 For example, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are participating in the Nimble Titan planning exercise 
being held in Monterey in June; Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Majority Staff 
Report, “The Gulf Security Architecture: Partnership with the Gulf Cooperation Council,” 17–18. 
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This chapter has analyzed the underlying problems and challenges of intra-GCC 
relations and the U.S.-GCC alliance that need to be considered in the development of a 
TBMD system in the region. The historical background of the Arab monarchies provides 
context to their reliance on foreign security guarantors and why members are reluctant to 
form stronger multilateral ties with one another. The evolution of the alliance from its 
inception in 1981 to the present showed a great willingness to work together at the 
beginning, but due to setbacks and failures, they came to rely on individual agreements 
with America for their security. The new regional order is forcing the alliance to 
reconsider how it functions, so that it can counter current and future threats. Member 
states are beginning to realize the utility of multilateralism, and that an endeavor such as 
TBMD requires a high degree of integration. Yet, there is still apprehension among the 
monarchs to take concrete steps towards cooperation and interoperability. The Emirates’ 
efforts toward promoting multilateralism in the IAMD realm is a starting point for further 
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VI. A PERSIAN GULF PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH 
The previous chapters have analyzed the three different regions where phased 
adaptive approaches for missile defense are being developed. The European and Asian 
theaters are further along in implementing TBMD architectures and provide guidance for 
pursuing similar missile defense initiatives in the Persian Gulf region. This chapter will 
utilize the alliance, threat, and collective defense analysis from previous chapters to 
compare and contrast the NATO and Japanese BMD experiences with the GCC’s 
emerging missile defense and collective security efforts. Through this comparative 
analysis lessons learned and key differences in threat capabilities and alliance structures 
are identified and applied to develop policy recommendations for implementing a phased 
adaptive approach to missile defense that is tailored to the threats, interests, and abilities 
of the U.S.’s Persian Gulf partners. Lastly, critical issues are identified that policymakers 
and defense specialists should consider as they move forward with the development of a 
TBMD architecture in the Persian Gulf region.      
A. THEATER COMPARISON AND LESSONS LEARNED 
Within the three different theaters where missile defenses are being implemented, 
the similarities and differences between them can be categorized into five areas: (1) 
alliance structure, (2) relationship with the United States, (3) geography, (4) nature of the 
threat, and (5) burden-sharing capability. Comparisons within these five areas provide 
lessons learned, which form the basis for developing policy recommendations for 
pursuing a phased adaptive approach to missile defense in the Persian Gulf.  
The European and Asian regions provide examples of the benefits and drawbacks 
of pursuing BMD initiatives through two different alliance structures. Europe is 
developing a TBMD architecture through the multilateral NATO alliance, while within 
the Asian theater, missile defense is progressing through bilateral agreements with the 
United States. The Persian Gulf is somewhat of a hybrid between these two alliance 
structures with a formal organization, the GCC, which is intended to strengthen 
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multilateral cooperation. But, in practice, its members have historically sought bilateral 
security assurances from foreign powers.  
BMD is best pursued as a collaborative endeavor, since it entails countering a 
threat that moves several times the speed of sound across expanses of land and ocean 
without regard for political boundaries or demarcations. The defense of an entire region 
requires cooperation among the various states within the defended area in order to be 
effective. Thus, a multilateral framework, while more challenging to balance 
responsibilities and negotiate information sharing, is the ideal alliance structure through 
which to pursue TBMD initiatives. Nevertheless, the bilateral U.S.-Japan alliance has 
produced a remarkably advanced TBMD architecture within the span of the last decade, 
which highlights the benefits of working within a bilateral arrangement with 
technologically advanced allies––the ability to negotiate differences and reach 
agreements more quickly in order to field operational capabilities. However, the limited 
geography of Japan as an island nation has greatly facilitated this success story, and it 
cannot be replicated in Europe or the Middle East. Additionally, the Japanese case is not 
a purely theater-based system, since it only defends one country. Merging Japan’s 
capabilities into a broader theater missile defense system is proving to be challenging, 
given the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region with China and Japan’s tepid 
relations with neighbors like South Korea. While the European example for TBMD has 
experienced setbacks due to the challenges of negotiating and comprising among 
numerous actors, in the long-term a multilateral framework results in a more effective 
and robust TBMD architecture. Thus, the Persian Gulf TBMD system would be best 
pursued through such a multilateral arrangement.  
The dynamics of geography and threat capabilities interact variably within each 
theater, thus resulting in different TBMD architecture requirements. The Persian Gulf 
faces shorter range and highly mobile ballistic missile threats that present a set of 
challenges different from the European and Asian examples. The shorter range allows 
only six minutes or less to react and counter an attack, and the mobility of launchers 
means there is greater uncertainty as the where an attack will originate. Thus, a 
thoroughly integrated system along with robust intelligence and surveillance is 
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paramount to countering the threats in this environment. Additionally, the compressed 
operating space makes engagement with land- or sea-based midcourse assets more 
challenging than in either the Asian or European theaters. The small midcourse phase 
window coupled with a challenging geometry to achieve such an engagement makes the 
Persian Gulf region a prime candidate for the development and implementation of early-
intercept technologies like airborne boost-phase intercept (ABI).  
The European and Asian alliance structures and their relationships with the 
United States have had more time to mature and grow than the GCC alliance. The Arab 
Gulf monarchs’ alliance was forged in the midst of conflict 32 years ago, and thus has 
had a shorter amount of time to develop, and it has had an even shorter period of 
sustained U.S. involvement. Additionally, the region has been mired in continuous 
conflict ever since the GCC’s formation, experiencing three major wars in the past three 
decades. Conversely, the NATO and U.S.-Japan alliances have been able to evolve under 
relatively peaceful conditions compared to the Middle East. All these factors contribute 
to a young alliance that is still evolving and learning how to be a multilateral entity. 
TBMD is an initiative that provides challenges as well as opportunities for this nascent 
organization to grow into a robust, genuinely multilateral alliance. Continued U.S. 
engagement can facilitate a shift from bilateral to more multilateral relations in this 
region through an initiative such as TBMD.    
Each region also has different capacities for burden-sharing in conducting 
research and in covering development costs. Europe and Japan have a considerably more 
robust ability to burden-share technological development than GCC partners. Japan has 
been the most successful in this respect, helping to co-develop the SM-3 Block IIA. 
European allies had a harder time burden sharing missile defense programs like MEADS, 
and ALTBMD is still yet to be fully implemented. The Persian Gulf theater lacks a strong 
burden-sharing capacity as a result of their oil-based, rentier economies that have 
stagnated the development of the indigenous industrial or technological bases for the 
research and development required in missile defense programs. Thus, the TBMD system 
in the Persian Gulf region will rely on purchasing U.S. technology and training through 
the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program; however, GCC states could financially 
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support foreign BMD research and development efforts. Additionally, with members like 
Saudi Arabia building state of the art science and technology universities, BMD could be 
designated as a major research aim at these institutions in the future, facilitating more 
collaborative R&D efforts between the United States and GCC members.146  
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The previous section identified lessons learned and key differences between the 
TBMD systems that have or are in the process of being implemented in the European and 
Asian theaters. These findings are incorporated into the following policy 
recommendations for implementing a tailored TBMD system for the Persian Gulf. While 
this region presents unique technological difficulties to countering ballistic missile 
threats, the political challenges of integrating capabilities across the GCC states present 
the most formidable obstacles to implementing a TBMD architecture in the Persian Gulf.  
The Persian Gulf TBMD system needs to be implemented through a multilateral 
framework. Given the short reaction time, mobility of the threat, and difficult 
engagement geometry of the region, cooperation will be paramount to effectively counter 
the current Iranian ballistic missile threat and possibly others that might emerge in the 
future. A robust and thoroughly integrated command, control, and communications 
structure, as well as cooperative sharing of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
assets and information needs to be established. Additionally, pre-planned response 
procedures need to be firmly in place and understood by highly trained operators.  
The GCC members who currently show the greatest capacity and receptiveness 
for furthering this TBMD initiative are the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. The UAE has 
its air warfare and IAMD centers that have already shown progress towards encouraging 
multilateral operations with other GCC and Arab League members as well as European 
and U.S. allies.147 The Emirates were also the first Gulf monarchs to purchase the 
                                                
146 Abdul Rahman Shaheen, “King Abdullah to open University of Science and Technology,” Gulf 
News, 22 September 2009, http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/king-abdullah-to-
open-university-of-science-and-technology-1.540370.   
147 Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Majority Staff Report, “The Gulf Security 
Architecture: Partnership with the Gulf Cooperation Council,” 17–18.  
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THAAD system. Qatar hosts the Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC) at 
Al Udeid Air Base, and it has participated in numerous multilateral exercises, some of 
which have taken place in Qatar. The UAE and Qatar have also shown a willingness to 
engage in operations outside of the Persian Gulf with both of them contributing air 
support to NATO operations in Libya, and Qatar has participated in humanitarian efforts 
in Haiti and Pakistan. Additionally, Qatar played a mediation role in various conflicts 
including Palestine, Eritrea, Lebanon, Sudan, and Yemen.148 Saudi Arabia is a long-time 
ally of the U.S. and a dominant power within the GCC organization. Riyadh has shown 
interest in procuring THAAD batteries as well as two Aegis BMD destroyers.149 This 
group could form the core BMD partners within the GCC alliance; this arrangement 
would provide a balance of the dominant Saudi power along with the two smaller Arab 
monarchies that desire to establish themselves as prominent figures within the strategic 
environment of the region and greater Middle East. This core BMD group would bridge 
the two factions within the GCC (the Saudi-aligned bloc with Bahrain and Kuwait and 
the more diplomatically autonomous group of UAE, Qatar, and Oman) and bring in the 
members who are acquiring point defense capabilities (i.e., PAC-3 batteries) and who 
could contribute sensor data to the overall system.  
A combined command, control, battle management, and communications 
(C2BMC) system should be built upon the HAT (Belt of Cooperation) elements already 
in place, and frequent IAMD exercises should be held with participation from all GCC 
members. The UAE’s IAMD center could be used as a coalition training facility for all 
GCC members along with U.S. and European allies. Trust and confidence among foreign 
operators can be fostered in the training environment that will carry over into real-world 
operations. IAMD exercises could be coordinated to coincide slightly before or after the 
biannual U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum (SCF) meetings, so that BMD progress 
and planned actions and milestones could be discussed to further the program’s initiatives 
in follow-on exercises. GCC participation in planning exercises and war-gaming events 
                                                
148 Ibid., 15.  




would allow members to address a spectrum of issues ranging from the policy realm to 
the operational and tactical levels. Sustained U.S. involvement throughout these BMD 
engagement activities would facilitate the transition from a bilateral to a multilateral 
framework where GCC allies remained reassured of U.S. commitment, but would be 
encouraged to integrate their efforts into a genuine collective security arrangement. 
The shorter reaction time and smaller window for midcourse engagement of the 
threat in the Persian Gulf will require a mixture of land, sea, and air based capabilities to 
provide a layered defense. With the GCC members’ interest in purchasing PAC-3 and 
THAAD systems, a robust terminal phase engagement capability will likely be present in 
the architecture, which would provide reassurance to each individual state of its defense 
against ballistic missile threats. Even though the midcourse engagement opportunity is 
small, it would still be a preferable option to terminal phase engagement. While the 
Persian Gulf has a compressed maritime space, sea-based intercept is still the best option 
for midcourse engagement, since there is not sufficient land area to put a shore-based 
midcourse system along the threat axis. In addition to doing little to enhance the layered 
defense capabilities of the architecture, an Aegis-Ashore option would be more of a target 
than an asset, and it probably would require more protection than it would provide to the 
overall construct. If an Aegis-Ashore option were to be pursued, the UAE and Qatar 
would provide the best basing options, since they already host significant IAMD 
components, and they have the infrastructure and willingness to accommodate such a 
system in their territory. Two U.S. BMD ships normally patrol the Persian Gulf, and the 
potential Saudi purchase of two BMD destroyers would add additional midcourse 
engagement capabilities. The sea-based terminal (SBT) interceptor that is being deployed 
on BMD ships offers an opportunity for a possible terminal engagement over water to 
avoid collateral damage on land. Due to the compressed geography and engagement 
windows, the Persian Gulf region would benefit greatly from early intercept capabilities. 
Thus, current research and development in boost- and ascent-phase technologies should 
be geared towards the needs of the Persian Gulf.    
Burden-sharing in research and development of future BMD technologies in the 
near-term with GCC allies should not be expected. The Arabian Peninsula monarchies’ 
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economies do not have sufficient industrial bases or technological sectors to support 
research and development efforts like the European and Asian theaters. Burden-sharing 
could be a long-term goal that is coupled with on-going diversification efforts within the 
Gulf states’ oil-driven economies. In the near-term, the GCC members will rely upon 
FMS sales to acquire their BMD capabilities, as they do with the majority of their defense 
equipment; additionally, the Arab monarchies could financially contribute to the R&D of 
ascent- and boost-phase technologies that would enhance the capabilities of the TBMD 
system in the region. FMS deals can have coalition training attached to the purchase to 
encourage cooperation and interoperability between member states. In the long-term, 
more collaborative R&D efforts could be pursued through the new science and 
technology universities being established in the Arabian Peninsula.  
C. CRITICAL ISSUES 
There remain critical issues that policymakers and defense specialists will need to 
consider carefully while moving forward with the implementation of a phased adaptive 
approach to missile defense in the Persian Gulf. These issues include:  
• The preservation of Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME), and the 
regional dynamics that will emerge with both Arab and Israeli BMD 
systems.  
• The possible challenges of sharing data with other TBMD systems.150 
• The collateral damage potentially caused from engaging a threat over 
politically or  culturally sensitive areas.151 
• The interests versus values paradox the United States faces in the Persian 
Gulf region with supplying autocratic regimes with another state-of-the-art 
defensive weapon system.152 
                                                
150 There has been discussion that stationing a TPY-2 radar in Qatar would allow triangulation 
capabilities between the TPY-2 radars stationed in Turkey and Israel, which would enhance the detection of 
ballistic missile launches from Iran. Given diplomatic relations between these states, how receptive would 
they be to sharing information from radars stationed in their respective territories? Boxx, “Countering the 
Iranian Missile Threat in the Middle East”; Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, “Pentagon Bulks Up 
Defenses in the Gulf,” The Wall Street Journal Online, 23 August 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304388004577531331722511516.html.  
151 For example, an engagement over or near Mecca and Medina; will the Saudis be solely responsible 
for the defense of these two cities even if another entity has a better chance of a successful engagement?  
What would be the political consequences of the U.S. engaging or not engaging a threat over the two Holy 
Cities?  
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These critical issues should be addressed at planning seminars and tabletop 
exercises where U.S. and GCC policymakers, diplomats, defense analysts, and military 
personnel can develop measured solutions to these challenges of pursuing TBMD in the 
Persian Gulf.     
D. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined the paradigm shift to theater-based missile defense 
systems from the point of view of the U.S. and its GCC partners, and through a 
comparative analysis with two other regions, has provided policy recommendations for 
developing a realistic pathway forward for implementing a tailored TBMD architecture in 
the Persian Gulf. The 2010 BMDR Report placed greater emphasis on theater-level 
missile defenses to counter WMD proliferation that threatens the European, Asian, and 
Middle Eastern regions. However, the European and Asian TBMD systems are 
significantly more developed than the Persian Gulf program. Thus, this thesis provides 
guidance for moving forward with the implementation of a phased adaptive approach to 
missile defense in the Persian Gulf that is tailored to the threats, interests, and abilities of 
the United States’ partners in this region.  
  Chapter II identified the de-emphasis of nuclear weapons’ role in 
American national security policy and strategy as the catalyst for pursuing non-nuclear 
means, such as theater-based missile defense, to maintain security assurances with allies 
in lieu of extended nuclear deterrence options. The proliferation of WMD and ballistic 
missile technologies in the third world following the end of the Cold War presents a 
greater threat to U.S. allies and deployed forces.  As a result, ballistic missile defense 
efforts have shifted to the theater level to counter these new threats. The Middle East is a 
region where the proliferation of such weapons has significantly contributed to its 
                                                                                                                                            
152 The Persian Gulf monarchs have thus far been able to stave off the threats of popular uprisings to 
regime stability and survival; however, situations like Bahrain will become increasingly more difficult to 
prevent and mitigate. The United States has sold an immense amount of weaponry and defense equipment 
to the GCC states, BMD being only one example. How does the U.S. promote an evolution in political 
liberalization in these countries to prevent destabilizing revolutions (i.e., the 1979 Iranian Revolution and 
the current conflict in Syria) from occurring and impeding the work accomplished thus far on defense 
programs in the region like BMD?    
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volatility, and TBMD is a mechanism to reassure key allies and bolster stability in this 
troubled corner of the world.  
Chapters III–V analyzed the European and Asian alliances and their TBMD and 
collective security initiatives in comparison to the Persian Gulf. Lessons learned and key 
differences were gained from this analysis that were applied in Chapter VI to the 
formulation of policy recommendations for implementing tailored missile defenses in the 
Persian Gulf region.   
The key policy recommendations in this thesis emphasize the need to pursue a 
phased adaptive approach to missile defense through a multilateral framework in the 
Persian Gulf. Sustained U.S. involvement will be required to facilitate the transition from 
bilateralism to multilateralism, which can be achieved through regular GCC participation 
in IAMD operational, planning, and war-gaming exercises that meet U.S.-GCC SCF 
objectives. A BMD core cadre of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE should be formed 
and relied upon to promote a unity of effort throughout the GCC alliance on BMD 
matters. The challenging geography and short-range, mobile ballistic missile threat in the 
Persian Gulf necessitates nothing less than full integration and interoperability of all GCC 
members. The consummation of a successful engagement against a threat of this nature 
begins well in advance of it ever being launched, and thus demands a concerted effort to 
overcome the current political obstacles to achieving greater cooperation and continuity 
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